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ABORTION: INFORMED CONSENT FOR THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
Amy K. Naegele

INTRODUCfION

A great deal of attention is focused on the question of abortion in today's
society.

Courts, legislatures and the media are constantly dealing with the issue of

abortion rights.

Most of the questions focus on whether a woman has the right to

obtain an abortion in a given situation. Little attention is given to the right to not have
an abortion; it is generally considered absolute. The question often arises, however, in
the case of an incompetent woman. When it does, those dealing with it will discover
that there is little existing law on which they can rely.

Consider, for example, the

following scenario:
Ann Smith is a twenty-year-old, mildly mentally retarded woman. Ann
has lived in Virginia her entire life. She has always been dependent on
her parents. When she reached the age of eighteen, Ann's parents, Mr.
and Mrs. Smith, petitioned the court and successfully had her adjudicated
incompetent.

The Smiths have been appointed Ann's legal guardians.

Ann has recently become pregnant. Her obstetrician believes that she is
approximately sixteen weeks pregnant. The Smiths feel that Ann should
have an abortion, and they have consented to the procedure. They are
convinced that Ann would not be able to care for a child by herself.
Although they are willing to help raise this grandchild, they are
concerned that, should they die before the child reaches adulthood, the
state would take the chid from Ann, devastating her. Ann, however, does
not want an abortion. She is very excited about the possibility of having
a baby and believes that, with the help of her parents, she could raise the
child.

She also believes that, once she proves that she can be a good

mother, no one will be able to take her child away. Ann's physician is
unwilling to perform the abortion because, although the Smiths, as her
legal guardians, have consented to it, Ann herself has repeatedly refused
to consent.
114

What is the physician to do in this situation?
consent to an abortion for Ann?

Which is the proper party to

Does the court have any power to order the

procedure?
This paper examines the current law in Virginia and its applicability to the
situation presented here. It proposes a scheme which might potentially be enacted by
the Virginia legislature, and examines it in terms of Constitutional propriety.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTNE

In an earlier time, when less was understood about mental retardation, a decision
regarding Ann's right to reproduce might have been influenced by the popular notion
of eugenics. In the early twentieth century, the belief that mental illness was genetic
was widely held. As a result, laws were passed which attempted to prevent procreation
by the mentally ill or incompetent. I
Virginia law authorized involuntary sterilization of persons committed to state
institutions for the mentally ill. 2

The Virginia Supreme Court explained that the

purpose of the statute was "to protect the class of socially inadequate citizens named
therein from themselves and to promote the welfare of society by mitigating race
degeneracy and raising the average standards for intelligence of the people of the
State."3 In Buck v. Bell,4 the court indicated that the interest of society in being free
from "mental defectives" outweighed the interest of Carrie Buck, an institutionalized

I
Annotation, Validity of Statutes Authorizing Asexualization or Sterilization of
Criminals or Mental Defectives, 53 A.L.R. 3d 960 (1973).

2 For a discussion of Virginia sterilization law in the 1920s, see Buck v. Bell,
143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925).
3
Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 318, 130 S.E. 516, 519 (1925), affd 274 U.S.
200 (1927).

4

143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925).
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woman, in not being sterilized. The court noted that Buck was the "probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise affected as she is."s
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Virginia decision in Buck v. Bell.6
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained the goal (and propriety) of eugenics:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for the lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. 7
Holmes' opinion reflects the view, widely held at the time, that the mentally
retarded have no interest in nor understanding of procreation. Thus, the Court gave its
approval to state policy designed to promote the interest and good of society by
subverting the rights of the mentally incompetent.
Had Ann's situation been presented at the time, she would probably have been
compelled to submit to the abortion. Evaluated under such a system, her right to make
the abortion decision would probably have been ignored. The interests of society in
preventing the birth of yet another "socially inadequate" individual would have
outweighed her interest in having a child.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell has never been
officially overturned.

Its validity, however, is questionable in light of current

understanding of mental illness and retardation and recognition of rights of individuals
- so impaired.8

S

[d. at 315, 130 S.E. at 517.

6

274 U.S. 200 (1927).

7

[d. at 207.

8
Modem case law has focused not only on involuntary sterilization, but also
on the right of the incompetent to choose sterilization as a method of contraception.
The states are varied in their approach to these problems. For an explanation of

116

CURRENT VIRGINIA LAW

Consent and Abortion Law
Virginia's current statutory scheme is ambiguous regarding the dilemma
presented by Ann's situation.

Analysis of the statutes regarding abortion, mental

incompetence, and consent to medical treatment reveals significant gaps in coverage of
the topic by the legislature.
Abortion is a crime in Virginia, unless performed in strict compliance with the
demands of the statutes. 9

The requirement most significant to the analysis of Ann's

right to decide whether to have an abortion is the requirement of informed consent.
The statute provides that the physician must obtain the informed written consent of any
woman seeking an abortion; if the woman is incompetent, the doctor may legally
perform the abortion only after consent has been given in writing by the woman's
guardian.\O Thus, the law requires two things: (1) consent by the pregnant woman, and
(2) consent by the guardian if the woman is incompetent.

The statute is silent,

however, as to whether the consent of the guardian is required in addition to or in lieu
of consent by the pregnant woman.
Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code ll provides two means for surrogate
decision-making regarding medical treatment for incompetents. The first allows persons
in designated classes to make decisions on behalf of incompetents. 12

This law

specifically excludes abortion from its operation, although the statute states that it is

various theories and approaches, see S.J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, & B.A. WEINER, THE
MENTAlLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 521-30 (1985).
9

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (1988).

10Id.
II

VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990)

12Id.
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simply an "alternative to other statutory and common law authority for making medical
decisions on behalf of adult persons unable to make informed decisions."13

The

surrogate decisionmaking statute is simply procedural; it does not alter the requirements
for informed consent. 14 Medical treatment of incompetents may also be authorized by
judicial order.ls Authorization of abortion is, however, specifically excluded from the
operation of this statute as well. 16
substitute decisionmaking

cannot

Although the statutorily prescribed means for
apply

to

abortion,

they demonstrate

policy

consideration by the Virginia legislature of the wishes of the incompetent individual.
Prior to authorizing medical treatment, the decisionmaker is required to consider the
incompetent's views regarding the proposed procedure, to the extent to which they can
be ascertained.

The surrogate decision making statute states that action relating to

treatment to which the incompetent person objects shall not be taken by the provider
of care, nor shall the surrogate authorize treatment to which he knows the incompetent
objects. 17 Similarly, in cases of judicial authorization of treatment, the court may not
authorize a course of treatment which is shown to be contrary to the basic values or
religious beliefs of the incompetent. 18 Thus, it is apparent that while Virginia allows
substituted decisionmaking for incompetents, its policy is to consider the feelings and
views of the incompetent who is to be subjected to the treatment.
The consent and abortion laws, therefore, shed little light on a solution to the
dilemma presented by Ann's situation. The statutes require that a guardian or similarly
situated person consent to an abortion for an incompetent woman, yet they provide no

13 VA.

CODE

ANN. § 37.1-134.4(A) (Supp. 1990).

14 [d.
IS

[d. at § 37.1-134.5.

16

[d. at § 37.1-134.5(H)(1).

17 [d. at § 37.1-134.4(D).
18 [d. at § 37.1-134.5(0)(4).
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means by which the required authorization may be given. They provide mechanisms
for consent to medical treatment for Ann, yet they specifically exclude abortion from
the operation of these mechanisms. They do, however, leave open the option of other,
non-statutory, means by which a substituted decision regarding medical treatment might
be made.

Additionally, the statutes illuminate Virginia policy choices reflecting a

concern for the views of the incompetent individual. The abortion statute specifically
requires consent of a guardian to an abortion for an incompetent, but does not specify
whether such consent is controlling in the absence of consent by the incompetent.
Under the existing statutory structure, perhaps the strongest argument that can
be made is one denying the authority of Ann's parents or the court to authorize the
abortion to which Ann will not consent. The statutes do not specifically allow for such
substituted consent in the case of abortion, and in fact explicitly deny the applicability
of consent statutes to the abortion laws.

Furthermore, the policy reflected in the

existing law is to respect the wishes of the incompetent individual. Ann has made her
objection to the abortion very clear, so compulsion of the procedure would apparently
violate this state policy.

Sterilization Law

In light of the ambiguity in the abortion and consent laws, an examination of
Virginia's law regarding sterilization of incompetents may be helpful in analyzing the
law's appropriateness as an analogy to the abortion situation. Virginia law provides a
procedure by which performance of a sterilization operation upon an adult incapable of
giving informed consent can be judicially authorized. 19

The sterilization law provides

clear procedural guidelines to the court in making the decision regarding sterilization.
In addition to ftling and notification requirements,21l the court must determine that the

§ 54.1-2976 (1988).

19

VA. CODE ANN.

211

[d. at §§ 54.1-2976(1), (2).
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individual has been adjudicated incompetent in accordance with Virginia law and is
unlikely to be competent in the foreseeable future to make the sterilization decision. 21
The physician must have explained to the person to be sterilized, to the best extent
possible, the operation and its risks, as well as available alternative means of
contraception.22 The court must elicit and consider the views of the person regarding
the sterilization.23

If the court issues an order for sterilization, a thirty-day waiting

period applies before the operation may be performed. 2A
The law also enumerates the requisite evidentiary fmdings, to be made through
medical, social and psychological evaluation of the person, which must precede any
authorization of sterilization by the court.

Specifically, in order to authorize

sterilization, the court must find that:
1.

There is a need for contraception. The court shall find that the

person is engaging in sexual activity at the present time or is likely to
engage in sexual activity in the near future and that pregnancy would not
usually be intended by such person if such person were competent and
engaging in sexual activity under similar circumstances;

2.

There is no reasonable alternative method of contraception to

sterilization;

3.

The proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard

medical practice, and the treatment can be carried out without
unreasonable risk to the life and health of a person; and
4.

The nature and extent of the person's mental disability renders

the person permanently incapable of caring for and raising a child. The
court shall base this finding on empirical evidence and not solely on
standardized tests. 2S

21

Id. at § 54.1-2976(4).

22

Id. at § 54.1-2976(3).

23

Id. at § 54.1-2976(5).

2A

Id. at § 54.1-2976(7).

2S

Id. at § 54.1-2977.
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These procedures and required findings reflect a concern for the rights of
mentally incompetent citizens on the part of the Virginia legislature. It is apparent that
Virginia currently seeks to ensure that the reproductive capabilities of its citizens are
protected and not removed unnecessarily or without due process of law.

Perhaps

similar provisions allowing substitute decisionmaking in the abortion context could be
implemented as well.
Applying the standards for sterilization to the abortion problem seems logical;
sterilization is the most closely analogous situation to abortion, although the two clearly
differ in significant ways (most notably in that sterilization renders the woman
permanently incapable of having a child, whereas abortion affects only a single
pregnancy).

Virginia could probably serve its legislative goals of protection of the

mentally incompetent by enacting an abortion consent statute similar to that for consent
to sterilization.

PROPOSED ABORTION CONSENT STATUTE

Applying the policy of Virginia's sterilization laws to the abortion consent
decision, a statutory scheme for judicial consent to abortion for an incompetent might
be as follows:
1.

The guardian must file a petition in circuit court requesting
authorization for the abortion;

2.

The incompetent must be served with notice of the
proceeding and an attorney must be appointed to represent
her interests;

3.

The court must determine that:

(a) the woman has been

adjudicated incompetent under Virginia law, and (b) she is
unlikely to become competent to make the abortion
decision in the foreseeable future;
4.

The physician must explain to the woman, to the extent
possible, the purpose of the abortion and the risks
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associated with the procedure, the process of childbirth and
the risks associated with it, and the availability of adoption
as an alternative to aborting or raising the child;
5.

The court must attempt to elicit and consider the views of
the woman regarding abortion;

6.

A short waiting period may be imposed (of course, the
thirty-day period required in cases of sterilization may be
unworkable in the abortion context);

7.

Prior to authorizing an abortion, the court must make the
following findings:
a) The woman is currently pregnant, the pregnancy was not
intentional, and the woman would not choose to give birth
were she competent;
b) Giving birth and placing the child for adoption is not
a reasonable alternative for the woman;
c) The proposed method of abortion conforms with standard
medical

practice

and

can

be

carried

out

without

unreasonable risk to the life; and
d) The woman is permanently incapable of caring for and
raising a child.
Analyzed under this potential statutory scheme, Ann's desire to carry her
pregnancy to term would have to be respected by the court and her parents. Although
the adjudication of Ann's incompetence would allow the court to make the decision for
her, the considerations mandated by the statutes would compel the court to deny any
petition by the Smiths to order an abortion. The court would be required to consider
Ann's wish to keep her child, although it would not be controlling. Prior to issuing
any order authorizing the abortion, the court would be required to find that Ann is
permanently incapable of raising a child, and that adoption would not be a reasonable
alternative.

Evidence of Ann's level of functioning would make such a finding

virtually impossible.

Ann is only mildly retarded, and she is obviously capable of

understanding the process of childbirth. Giving birth and placing the child for adoption
would therefore be a reasonable alternative for her. It is also quite possible that Ann
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could learn to be an adequate parent and raise the child herself.
Although a substituted consent statute for abortion modeled after the sterilization
statute might be workable in a practical sense, it remains to be seen whether Virginia
could legally enact such a statute.

The proposal must be examined in tenns of

constitutional requirements.

CONSTI1UTIONAL ANALYSIS

Reproductive rights is a very volatile area of constitutional law.

The United

States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the issue in differing contexts.
Although the extent to which the rights may be exercised varies in different situations,
the Court has generally recognized that the right to procreate and the right to choose
not to procreate are fundarnental. 26 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,T1 the Court characterized
the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man."2B
The choice not to procreate generally receives more attention in litigation. The
cases addressing this right usually deal with either contraception or abortion.
Contraception is a basic right available to all. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,29 the Court stated
that an individual has a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. "30 The right of a woman to secure an abortion, subject to certain permissible

26 See, e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception
for married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to contraception
for unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose to
terminate pregnancy).

'II

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

2B [d. at 541.
29

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

30

[d. at 453.
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restraints imposed by the state, is also fundamental. 3!
The availability of these rights to mentally retarded or incompetent individuals,
however, is less often addressed than their availability to competent individuals, and has
never been addressed in Virginia.

There are few reported cases dealing with the

performance of abortions upon incompetent women. The United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue. The state courts that have heard such cases have generally
held that substituted decisionmaking is appropriate to authorize an abortion on an
incompetent woman, but have differed in the determination of who should make the
surrogate decision and what standards should be used in deciding.
A lower court in New York held that consent by the father to the performance
of an abortion on his institutionalized, mentally retarded twenty-five year old daughter
was adequate and judicial approval of the decision was unnecessary.32 In addition, the
father was not required to use the best interests of his daughter as the standard for
making the decision. 33

An lllinois appellate court, on the other hand, held that in

making the abortion decision, the guardian must use the best interests of the ward as
the standard, although it was not necessary to demonstrate medical necessity for the
procedure. 34 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in denying a stay of a trial court's
order that a guardian ad litem consent to an abortion, noted that if the woman were
competent she would have an absolute right to terminate her pregnancy.35 The only
question for the court, it reasoned, was whether the woman would choose abortion if

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The current status of this right is the
topic of intense controversy. The basic right, however, still exists, having withstood,
largely intact, the latest attack upon it in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
_ U.S. _ , 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
3!

32

In re Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 474 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).

33

Id. at 139, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 801.

34

In re Estate of D.W., 134 Ill. App. 3d 788, 481 N.E.2d 355 (1985).

35

In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987).
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she were competent.36 In addition, the Supreme Court of California has indicated in
dicta that a conservator would have power to choose an abortion for a ward.1'7 Thus,
several states have assumed the power to allow substituted decisionmaking in the
abortion context and have apparently been unchallenged.
State court cases dealing with sterilization have included more in-depth analysis
of the reproductive rights of the mentally retarded.

In In re Moe,38 a Massachusetts

appellate court was asked, in the absence of an authorizing statute, to allow a guardian
to consent to the sterilization of an incompetent woman. The court noted that "[t]he
right to reproduce and the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the
very heart of the constitutionally protected right to privacy."39

The inability of the

incompetent to exercise this right to choose, the court felt, did not mean that the right
was inapplicable to the incompetent.4O

It was necessary, therefore, to exercise the

woman's right to choose sterilization in an alternate way. The court held that, due to
the intrusiveness and permanency of the sterilization operation, the guardian must obtain
a court order authorizing consent.41 The court determined that, in deciding whether to
issue a sterilization order, a court "should attempt to ascertain the ward's actual
preference for sterilization, parenthood, or other means of contraception. "42

This

decision emphasizes the importance to an incompetent woman of the right to make
procreational choices, and identifies a means by which this right might be exercised.

36

Id. at 526.

1'7 Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387
(1985).
38

385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).

39

Id. at _ , 432 N.E.2d at 719.

40

Id. at _ , 432 N.E.2d at 720.

41

Id. at _ , 432 N.E.2d at 716-17.

42

Id. at _ , 432 N.E.2d at 722.
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This concern with the right of reproductive choice, and a means to exercise it, are
similarly reflected in the proposed Virginia statute.
In Mildred G. v. Valerie N.,43 the legality of a California statute prohibiting the
sterilization of incompetent individuals was challenged. The California Supreme Court
held that the law unconstitutionally deprived incompetent individuals of their liberty and
privacy interests in procreative choice. 44 Incompetent women, according to the court,
must have available to them the same contraceptive choices available to competent
women, including sterilization. Nonetheless, the court recognized that an incompetent
woman would be unable to realistically exercise the choice available to her.

It

concluded, therefore, that "[t]rue protection of procreative choice can be accomplished
only if the state permits the court-supervised substituted judgment of the conservator to
be exercised on behalf of a conservator who is unable to personally exercise this
right."4.5 As with the Massachusetts decision, the proposed Virginia law addresses the
concerns of the court regarding reproductive choice and offers a potential solution.
Chief Justice Bird entered a strong dissent to the decision in Valerie N ..46 She
found serious problems with the majority's characterization of the possibility of
substituted consent, writing as follows:
Today's holding will permit the state, through the legal fiction of
substituted consent, to deprive many women permanently of the right to
conceive and bear children. The majority run roughshod over this
fundamental constitutional right in a misguided attempt to guarantee a
right of procreative choice or one they assume has never been capable
of choice and never will be. Yet precisely because choice and consent
are meaningless concepts when applied to such a person, the majority's
invocation of the theory of procreative choice and the fiction of
substituted consent cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.47

43 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985).
44

Id. at 160-61, 707 P.2d at 771-72, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399.

4.5 Id. at 168, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
46

Id. at 174, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).

47Id. at 174-75, 707 P.2d at 781-82, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
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Bird disagreed with the majority's unsupported conclusion that the conservator could
authorize an abortion for the conservatee.48 She argued that abortion only occurs as a
result of choice, which is meaningless to one incapable of choosing. She characterized
the right to procreate, on the other hand, not as a result of choice, but rather as a
deeper, constitutional right. 49 According to Bird, the right of an incompetent woman to
procreate is not diminished by her incompetence because it is not a function of a
capacity to make informed decisions; her right to make reproductive choices, on the
other hand, is a function of the capacity to make informed decisions and is therefore
diminished by incompetence. 50

Under Bird's analysis, a law allowing substituted

consent for abortion would not be upheld because the incompetent's right to procreate
is to be respected above any fictional attempt to allow choice to a woman incapable of
exercising it. Bird's view, however, is not that of the majority.
Some commentators argue that the right to procreate is a function of mep.tal
capacity because it involves the exercise of an informed choice. Scott believes that the
right to procreate involves the right to produce children to rear, and thus requires the
intention and ability to parent. SI

She suggests that the right to bear a child is not

available to a woman who is incapable of caring for a child, while a woman with
adequate mental capacity to parent has a legally protected interest in procreation.52 She
would employ the standard used to terminate parental rights in determining whether the
woman is capable of becoming a parent. S3 Her concerns regarding parenting capacity

48

[d. at 183, 707 P.2d at 787-88, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.

49

[d. at 181-82, 707 P.2d at 786, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 413.

50

[d. at 182, 707 P.2d at 786-87, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 414.

SI Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and
Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.I. 806, 829 (1986).

52

[d. at 831, 850.

S3

[d. at 833.
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are addressed by provision 3 in the proposed statute requiring that the court find that
a woman is permanently incapable of raising a child prior to issuing an order for an
abortion.
Robertson similarly suggests that the right to procreate depends upon mental
capacity.

He argues that true reproductive choice encompasses both the right not to

procreate and the right to procreate. S4 He believes that the right to procreate depends
not upon the ability to parent, but upon the ability to comprehend the significance of
procreation.15 Under his model, compelling abortion upon a mildly mentally retarded
woman capable of understanding the significance of procreation, whether or not she is
fit to parent, would infringe upon her right of procreation. 56

The proposed statute

allows procreational rights to all who deserve them according to Robertson's scheme.
In order to authorize an abortion, the court is required to fmd that the woman is unfit
to parent and that adoption is not a reasonable option for her. If the court finds that
adoption is an option for the woman because, although she is incapable of parenting,
she can comprehend the process of childbirth and wishes to experience it, it must allow
her to give birth.
The general conclusion of most courts that have considered the issue of
reproductive rights of the incompetent is that the right to procreate or not to procreate
is a personal right which cannot be denied simply because the individual is mentally
disabled.

As a result, the right can be exercised for the person by another.

The

proposed statutory scheme provides a means to assure the mentally incompetent in
Virginia the same reproductive choices available to competent women, and therefore,
properly complies with constitutional requirements.

S4 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 406, 463 (1983).

15 [d. at 413.
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CONCLUSION

Although significant changes in the law regarding the reproductive rights of
incompetents have occurred since the days of Buck v. Bell,S? Virginia's current law
contains significant ambiguities regarding perfonnance of abortions upon incompetent
women. The statute requires consent of a guardian to the procedure, but provides no
means by which such consent can be given. In addition, it fails to specify whether the
consent of the incompetent woman or the consent of the guardian is controlling in cases
in which there is conflict.

No statute authorizes courts to resolve such conflicts.

Virginia law does, however, allow substituted consent to sterilization and other medical
treatment, but specifically excludes abortion from the operation of the authorizing
statutes. Therefore, under current Virginia law, it is not legal to perfonn an abortion
upon an incompetent woman who has not consented to the procedure regardless of
consent by her guardian.
The Virginia legislature could, however, enact a statute allowing for judicial
authorization of perfonnance of abortions upon incompetent women. Were the law to
be modeled after the current statute for involuntary sterilization, it would serve the
state's policy goals of protection of the rights of the mentally incompetent. Although
courts have expressed concern regarding the wishes of the incompetent, a statute which
mandated consideration of the expressed views of the incompetent would likely be legal.

S?

274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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ST ANDARDS OF SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT
FOR APPLYING SURROGATE TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING
FOR INCOMPETENT ADULTS IN VffiGINIA
Melanie F. Michaelson

INTRODucnON

In the Spring, 1990, issue of the Colonial Lawyer, 1 Deborah A. Ryan criticized
the Virginia Natural Death Act and its narrow definition of persistent vegetative state.2
This article will discuss Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code that authorizes, among
other things, an appointed surrogate to provide, withhold, and withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment for certain incompetent persons. 3 This statute is one of the most
progressive in the country, as evidenced by the number of cases from other jurisdictions
that underscore their state legislature's lack of action in this area. 4
Because Section 37.1-134.4 is a relatively new statute, Virginia courts have little
statutory interpretation.

As a result, Virginia must look to decisions in other state

courts in order to give guidance to those making health care decisions for an
incompetent adult. This article will first discuss the requirements of the statute itself
and then address the medical evidence necessary to support the different standards of
substitute judgment decisionmaking.

Next, the article will discuss the three different

standards of substitute judgment available to a decisionmaker when fulfilling the
statute's requirements:

(1) the substitute-intent standard, (2) the limited-objective

standard, and (3) the pure-objective standard. These standards will then be balanced

1
Ryan, Virginia's Natural Death Act: Is It Useful to Individuals in a
Persistent Vegetative State?, 19 COL. LAW. 34 (1990).

2

See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990).

3

VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990). See Appendix A.

4

See cases discussed infra.
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against five state interests: (1) preserving life, (2) protecting innocent third parties, (3)
preventing suicide, (4) maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity, and (5) the
cost of medical care.

Finally, the article will conclude that Virginia has provided a

workable solution for surrogates making medical decisions for incompetent adults.

THE VIRGINIA SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING STATUTE

In Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code, the Virginia General Assembly has
provided for substituted consent to medical treatment in the case of an incompetent and
terminally ill adult patient. s

Since the General Assembly has already weighed the

S VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990).
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12986 (1988). This statute, the Natural Death Act, limits substituted consent
decisionmaking by providing that:

Life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from an
adult patient with a terminal condition who (i) is comatose,
incompetent or otherwise physically or mentally incapable of
communication and (ii) has not made a declaration in accordance with
this article, provided there is consultation and agreement for the
withholding or the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures between
the attending physician and [certain individuals to refuse treatment on
behalf of the patient].

See also, Note, The 'Terminal Condition' Condition in Virginia's Natural
Death Act, 73 VA. L. REv. 749, 750 (1987). Under the Natural Death Act, a patient
has a "terminal condition" if "there is 'a reasonable degree of medical certainty [that]
(i) there can be no recovery and (ii) [the patient's] death is imminent.'" [d. (quoting
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (1988». Under the statute, life-prolonging procedures
may be withdrawn from only a "qualified patient." [d. at n.8. A "qualified patient"
is defined as one who has a "terminal condition." [d. "Terminal," however, does
not clearly define a medical condition. [d. Colloquially, "terminal" is equated with
incurability. [d. In medicine, however, many chronic diseases, such as chronic
congestive heart failure, are rarely terminal. [d. For medical purposes, the word
"imminent" is rarely defmed. [d. at 150 n.11.
See also, Note, The Virginia Natural Death Act - A Critical Analysis 17 U.
L. R. 863, 871-72 (1983) [hereinafter Critical Analysis]. But see Letter From
Attorney General Gerald L. Baliles to The Honorable G. Steven Agee, Member,
House of Delegates (August 2, 1983), regarding the issue of whether one may,
pursuant to the Virginia Natural Death Act, have the use of kidney dialysis,
intravenous feeding, and oxygen withdrawn or terminated as life-prolonging
procedures under the provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (1988):
RICH.

A different result would undoubtedly follow if oxygen were administered by
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benefits and burdens of substituted consent,6 this article will focus on the standards that
are available to the decisionmaker making a substituted judgment for an incompetent
adult. By restricting this article to the case of an adult who was formerly competent,
this article avoids the slippery slope argument, predicting that the use of substituted
judgment will result in the forced termination of care for society'S "undesirables," that
is more readily available when the adult always lacked competency.' The case of an
adult who could never have been found competent is similar to the more difficult cases
of infants, children, and other so-called "incompetents," such as the mentally retarded,
where federal statutes may be implicated. 8 For this reason, these cases are beyond the
scope of this article.
In examining the standards the decisionmaker may utilize, this article assumes
that the identity of the decisionmaker is not relevant

to

the choice of the standard used.

The Virginia Statute lists the order of priority of those who may authorize the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment: (1) anyone given such authority in a writing
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 54.1-2984; (2) an authorized guardian; (3) anyone
appointed under a durable power of attorney that grants such authority to decide,

different means for the purpose of supplanting the spontaneous function of
breathing; similarly, a different result would undoubtedly follow if intravenous
feeding was not for the purpose of providing comfort against dehydration but
was mainly for the purpose of supplanting the spontaneous functions of
receiving necessary nourishment into the body in amounts adequate to
maintain life. In both situations, of course, before terminating the procedure,
it would be necessary for the physician first to find that the patient was in a
terminal condition and that the process served only to prolong the dying
process.
6

See Critical Analysis, supra note 5, at 870-71.

, See Matter of Storar and Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
8 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a-5106h (1988) (The Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act requires that states, in order to receive certain federal funds, meet
certain legal and administrative standards ensuring that the state's protective services
respond to "medical neglect" cases).
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provided that they are not employed by the doctor or anyone employing the doctor; (4)
a husband or wife; (5) an adult child; (6) parent(s); (7) an adult sibling; or (8) any
other relative, to be decided in descending order of blood relationship.9 Any of these
individuals should come to the same conclusions when applying the standards set forth
in this article.
Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code lo specifies procedures available for
surrogate treatment decisionmaking. 11

While the statute mandates that the surrogate

base his decision on the "best interests" of the person, the statute contains language that
requires the surrogate to consider factors that are clearly part of the "substituted intent"
standard.

The statute provides, for example, that it does "not authorize providing,

continuing to provide, withholding or withdrawing treatment if the [person providing]
the treatment knows or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know that such an action is
protested by the person."12 Also, no person can authorize treatment that he knows, or
ought to know, "is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the person unable

9 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Supp. 1990); See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1
to - 11-9.2 (1989) (concerning durable power of attorney); see Appendix B. But see
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988). The order of priority of the decision makers in
Section 54.1-2986 of the Natural Death Act is as follows:
1. The judicially appointed guardian or committee of the patient if one
has been appointed . . . ; or
2. The person or persons designated by the patient in writing to make
the treatment decision for him should he be diagnosed as suffering
from a terminal condition; or
3. The patient's spouse; or
4. An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more than one
adult child, by a majority of the children who are reasonably available
for consultation; or
5. The parents of the patient; or
6. The nearest living relative of the patient.
10 V A. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990).
11

[d. at § 37.1-134.4(H).

12

[d. at § 37.1-134.4(0) (Supp. 1990).

133

to make a decision, whether [the beliefs or values are] expressed orally or in writing."n
These factors require the decisionmaker to try to determine what the individual would
have wanted, and not what the decisionmaker, in the flrst instance, believes to be in the
"best interests" of the incompetent individual. Therefore, in interpreting this statute, the
courts should view the statute as creating a hybrid "substitute intent" -- "best interest"
standard.

THE DOCfRINE OF SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT

To examine the standards of the doctrine of substitute judgment, the doctrine
itself must be clearly defined. The law supports the idea that incompetence does not
deprive an individual of the right to decide treatment questions. 14 This right remains
as if the patient were still competent. IS Someone else, however, must exercise this right
for the incompetent individual. 16 The decision is a substitute for the patient's own, and
is therefore called "substitute judgment."17 The law recognizes a constitutional right to
"bodily privacy, found in the penumbras of various fundamental rights .... "18

Along

with the tort principles that prohibit nonconsensual touching,19 that right to bodily

13

14
(1981).

Id.
D. MEYERS, MEDIco-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

OF

DEATII AND DYING

§ 15:2, at 470

IS Id. at 471 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977»; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976».

16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Brant, The Right To Die in Peace: Substituted Consent And The Mentally
Incompetent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 959, 960 (1977).
19
Id. at 961 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. CiT. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (competent adults may determine when they will
consent to treatment); Schloendorff v. Soc. of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (surgeon performing operation without adult patient's consent
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privacy can be extended to disallow medical care without the patient's infonned
consent.20

The doctrine of substitute judgment extends this right to the incompetent

individual who is not able to grant his/her consent by allowing another to act for the
incompetent in a manner consistent with the incompetent's wishes had he/she remained
competent. 21
The number of cases discussing this doctrine has increased due to the advances
in medical technology that have allowed a person with "minimal brain functioning" to
be sustained without being deemed brain dead. 22 Courts, however, have been grappling
with the issues of whether, when and by whom medical treatment may be withdrawn
from an incompetent person since Karen Quinlan lapsed into a coma on April 15,
1975.23 The courts are still looking for answers. Most recently, with the case of Nancy

commits assault).
20
Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 35, _ , 355 A.2d 647, 662 (1976) (court
allowed patient in vegetative state to be withdrawn from respirator».

Weber, Substitute Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. &
MIlO. 131, 135 (1985).
21

John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984).
As the court in Bludworth stated:
22

It is now possible to hold such persons on the threshold of death for
an indeterminate period of time by utilizing extraordinary mechanical
or other artificial means to sustain their vital bodily functions. The
procedures used can be accurately described as a means of prolonging
the dying process rather than a means of continuing life.
Id.
The Florida Supreme Court held that in the case of a terminally ill and
comatose patient who had executed a "living" will, "it is not necessary that a courtappointed guardian of his person obtain approval of [the] court ... before
tenninating extraordinary life support systems in order for consenting family
members, attending physicians, and hospital and its administrators to be relieved of
civil and criminal liability .... " Id. at 926. Merely good faith is necessary. Id.
23
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _ , 355 A.2d 647, 653-54 (1976). On April 15,
1975, Karen Quinlan stopped breathing at least twice, for fifteen-minute periods at a
time. Id. at _ , 355 A.2d at 653-54. She was left in a persistent vegetative state.
Id. at _ , 355 A.2d at 654. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the right to
tenninate her life by removing her life-support was incident to her right of privacy
which could be asserted on her behalf by her guardian. Id. at _ , 355 A.2d at 664.
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Cruzan, the Supreme Court essentially left the states free to detennine the standards they
will require before allowing the withdrawal of medical care, including food and water,
from an incompetent individual. 24 As Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe
notes, however, the Cruzan case reveals the unprecedented recognition by eight Supreme
Court justices of some degree of constitutional protection for the "right to die. "25 These
cases continue to arise because the courts have failed to spell out standards for the
substitute decisionmaker to apply in detennining what the incompetent patient would
decide if still competent.

MEDICAL EVIDENCE

When making a health-care decision for an incompetent, the decisionmaker must
decide and carry out, to the degree possible, the care the individual, if competent, would
have chosen.26 The court in In re Peter, however, noted that before making any healthcare decisions, the decisionmaker must understand the patient's medical condition and
likelihood of recovery.27

Therefore, "[t]he focal point of such decisions should be

24
See Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc). Nancy Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative state after an auto accident
deprived her brain of oxygen for an estimated twelve to fourteen minutes (the trial
judge found that deprivation of six minutes results in permanent brain damage). Id.
at 410-11. When efforts to rehabilitate Nancy over a substantial period of time
failed, her parents (acting as her guardians) sought a judicial order sanctioning their
belief that Nancy would want her artificial nutrition and hydration tenninated. Id.
The Circuit Court ordered that the request be carried out, id. at 411, but the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed this decision, noting the state policy of preserving
life and finding no "legal basis which pennits the coguardians in this case to choose
the death of the ward." The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri
Supreme Court decision in Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, _ U.S. _ , 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).

25

The Washington Post, July 2, 1990, at A5, col. 1.

26 N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 63 (1987) [hereinafter
CANTOR] (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985».
'E1
In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, _ , 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987). In 1984 Hilda
Peter lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. Id. at _ , 529 A.2d at 428. Ms.
Peter had effected a power of attorney, which authorized her friend, Eberhard
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whether there is a reasonable medical expectation of the patient's return to a cognitive
life as distinguished from the forced continuance of a vegetative existence. "28

This

inquiry can be made by looking for two factors set out by the court in Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hospital: (1) "the incapable patient's condition ... is pennanent
and irreversible and there is no reasonable medical probability that the patient ever will
return to a cognitive state, [and] (2) the patient's attending physician together with at
least two other consulting physicians unanimously concur as to the patient's condition
• • • • "29

These factors insure that the patient truly requires a substitute decision maker

to carry out his wishes regarding increased or continued medical care.
Once the decisionmaker determines that the patient has no reasonable possibility
of regaining his or her cognitive abilities, the decisionmaker should begin to weigh the
other medical factors. The court in the Peter case followed Quinlan concluding "that

Johanning, to make her health-care decisions. [d. at _ , 529 A.2d at 422. As her
guardian, Johanning requested that Peter's nasogastric tube be withdrawn. [d. at _ ,
529 A.2d at 422. The New Jersey Supreme Court set the standard of proof
necessary to avoid judicial review in a substituted judgment case as clear and
convincing. [d. at _ , 529 A.2d at 427. See also VA. CoDE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(E)
(Supp. 1990). This section provides that:
Prior to the initiation or cessation of treatment for which authorization has
been obtained or will be sought pursuant to this section, and no less
frequently than every 180 days while the treatment continues, the physician
shall obtain a written certification that the person is incapable of making an
informed decision regarding the treatment This certification shall be made
by a licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist who is not otherwise
currently involved in the treatment of the person assessed and shall be based
on a personal examination of the person. The cost of the assessment shall be
considered for all purposes a cost of the treatment provided.
28

John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).

29 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, _ , 482 A.2d
713, 721 (1984). Sandra Foody had suffered from severe multiple sclerosis for 24
years, when, at age 42, she "suffered a respiratory arrest" leaving her unable to
breathe without a respirator and in a semicomatose state. [d. at _ , 482 A.2d at
715-16. Her family brought an action to restrain the hospital staff and doctors from
using artificial means to continue Sandra's breathing and heart rate. [d. at _ , 482
A.2d at 713. The court ruled in favor of allowing a substitute decision to be made
for Sandra because there was no state interest sufficient to override her rights. [d. at
_ , 482 A.2d at 720.
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the life-expectancy of the patient ... is not an important criterion," especially when the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state.30 Nancy Cruzan, for example, could live in
such a state for thirty more years?!
The court in Barber v. Superior Court stated that a determination should be
made as to whether the proposed treatment will benefit or burden the patient.32 The
court then explained that "the determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are
worth enduring for any individual patient depends on facts unique to each case, namely,
how long the treatment is likely to extend life and under what conditions.'t33 The New
Jersey court, however, in In re Conroy,34 noted that the focus should be upon the
patient's "experience of pain and enjoyment [and] not the type of treatment involved."3.'5
The decisionmaker should not allow a certain treatment because it appears to be only
slightly invasive of the patient's body if that treatment has little probability of ultimately
returning the patient to a cognitively functioning state. Conversely, a highly invasive

30

Peter, 108 N.J. at _ , 529 A.2d at 424.

3! Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Harmon 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc), aff d Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, _ U.S.
_ , 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
491 (1983). In Barber, two physicians were charged with murder and conspiracy to
commit murder because they removed the patient's intravenous tubes and
discontinued life-support pursuant to a request by the patient's family. Id. at 101011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court found, inter alia, that the doctors' failure to
continue life-sustaining treatment, although "intentional and with knowledge" of
certain death for the patient, did not constitute "an unlawful failure to perform [their]
legal duty." Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-93.
32

33

Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.

34

98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).

3S Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1233. The patient, an eighty-four-year-old woman
a limited time to live, confined to bed and living in a nursing home, was both
physically and mentally impaired. Her nephew, acting as guardian, sought to have
her feeding tube removed. Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1216. The court continued to
review the case even though Claire Conroy died before it reached the New Jersey
Appellate Division. Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1219.
w~th
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treatment should not be denied if it has a strong probability of aiding the patient. 36
Bec.ause the goal of a substitute decisionmaker is to give effect to the patient's
rights, the Conroy court stated that the decisionmaker must base his or her decision on
"at least as much medical infonnation" as a competent person would have. 37 The court
then suggested an extensive list of medical evidence upon which to base this decision,
including:
evidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional,
and cognitive functioning; the degree of physical pain resulting from the
medical condition, treatment, and termination of treatment, respectively;
the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably
resulting from the condition and treatment; . . . the various treatment
options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of these options. 38
The court concluded that by considering these factors the decisionmaker avoids the error
of basing his conclusions on a hastily made diagnosis or prognosis. 39 This infonnation
will also help the decisionmaker decide whether the treatment benefits or burdens the
patient and whether the patient's condition is clearly irreversible.

STANDARDS FOR APPLYING
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT DECISIONMAKING

Substitute-Intent Standard
The substitute intent standard is the strictest of the substitute judgment standards
of decisionmaking. Once the decisionmaker has examined all aspects of the patient's
proposed and current medical care, he then must decide what the patient's preferences
would be in the present situation.40 In order to determine a patient's preference, the

36

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.

37

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A2d at 1231.

38

Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1231.

39

Id. at _ , 486 A2d at 1231.

40

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
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decisionmaker must determine, as accurately as possible, the wants and needs of the
incompetent individua1. 41 As noted by the court in Foody, this is an individual standard,
and may not necessarily "conform to what the majority deems wise or prudent."42 The
patient's previous statements provide the best way to judge what he would choose. The
clearest evidence of this is usually a "living will" that clearly specifies the patient's
wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment. 43 Since Virginia recognizes living wills as
legally binding, such advance directives are relevant evidence of the patient's intent. 44
The New Jersey court in the case of In re Peter noted that the patient had executed a
power of attorney authorizing a friend to make all of her health-care decisions. 45 A
writing is very suggestive of an individual's "seriousness of purpose. "46 Also, a person
who takes the time

to

set out his wishes in writing will more likely ensure that any

changes are subsequently recorded.41 According to Virginia law, however, the absence
of a "living will" does not raise a presumption regarding a patient's intention with

41
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
492 (1983).

42

Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at _ , 482 A.2d at 720.

43
In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, _ , 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987). A Living Will is
defined as "[a] written directive by an adult patient authorizing the withholding or
withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining procedures in the situation of tenninal
illness." I. SLOAN, THE RIGHT To DIE: LEGAL AND ETIlICAL PROBlEMS 142 (1988).

44

See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Appendix B.

45

Peter, 108 N.J. at _ , 529 A.2d at 422.

46
In re Westchester County Medical Center, ex rei. Mary O'Connor, 72
N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d flJ7, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988). Mary
O'Connor was an elderly, hospitalized individual, had suffered several strokes, and,
as a result, was mentally incompetent and incapable of receiving nourishment without
medical assistance. The hospital sought a court order permitting them to insert a
nasogastric tube that was objected to by Mrs. O'Connor's daughters. Id. at 523-34,
531 N.E.2d at flJ8, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. The court ruled in favor of the
hospital because there was no clear and convincing evidence that she would not want
the tube inserted. Id. at 530-34, 531 N.E.2d at 613-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.

41

Id., 531 N.E.2d at 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
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regard to life-sustaining procedures.48
The decision maker may also be guided by statements made by the patient before
he became incompetent.

For example, a decisionmaker may consider a patient's

verbalized response to medical treatment previously administered to another.49 In the
case of In re Jobes,$) the court observed that the incompetent's husband remembered
his wife stating that "she would not want to be kept alive under Karen Quinlan'S
circumstances."

She made these comments frequently in 1976 and 1977, when the

Quinlan case was making news. 51 However, as Conroy stated, "the probative value of
such evidence [demonstrating intent] may vary depending on the remoteness,
consistency, and thoughtfulness of the prior statements or actions and the maturity of
the person at the time of the statements or acts."Sl The court in Cruzan v. Harmon was
reluctant to accept statements that Nancy had made to friends that if she were "sick or
injured she would not want to continue [living] unless she could live 'halfway
normal. "'53

Regardless of the problems with a patient's prior statements, respect for

patient autonomy requires that every effort be made to carry out the patient's own
preferences as previously communicated.54

§ 54.1-2986 (1988).

48

VA. CODE ANN.

49

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985).

so

108 N.J. 394, 529 A2d 434 (1987).

51
Id. at _ , 529 A2d at 442. Nancy Jobes was thirty-one years old and four
and one-half months pregnant when she was admitted to the hospital for treatment of
injuries received in a car accident. Physicians determined that the fetus had been
killed. During an operation to remove the fetus, she suffered brain damage due to
the loss of blood and oxygen flow to her brain. Id. at _ , 529 A.2d at 437. She
never regained consciousness, Id. at _ , 529 A2d at 438. Her husband brought an
action seeking removal of the hydration and nutrition that was keeping his wife
alive. Id. at _ , 529 A.2d at 437.

52

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A2d at 1230.

53

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.

54

CANfOR,

supra note 26, at 64.
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Less direct evidence of intent may also be examined, including the patient's
religious beliefs, or a "consistent pattern of conduct" regarding prior medical treatment. 55
The court in Jobes explained that:
The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about and reactions
to medical issues, and all the facets of the patient's personality that the
surrogate is familiar with - with, of course, particular reference to his or
her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical values - in order to
extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient would choose. S6
The court in In re Quinlan noted that Karen's father consulted with his parish priest
and the hospital chaplain in order "[t]o confirm the moral rightness of the decision he
was about to make . . . .

"S7

Karen's father testifled that he would not have sought

termination of the life support if the act conflicted with the tenets of his religion. 58 The
New York court in O'Connor explained that the persistence, seriousness and context of
the individual's statements regarding the termination of life-supports are among those
factors which help convince the decisionmaker that the strength and durability of the
patient's "beliefs makes a recent change of heart unlikely."59

In this way, the

decision maker effectively carries out the patient's wishes about medical care.

Limited-Objective Standard
The court in Conroy established two alternative tests under which treatment
might be withheld or tenninated when the medical information is insufficient or the

55

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1233, 1230 (1985).

S6

Jobes, 108 N.J. at _ , 529 A.2d at 444.

S7

Quinlan, 70 N.J. at _ , 355 A.2d at 658.

58

Id. at _ , 355 A.2d at 658.

59 O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d at 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at
886, 892.
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patient's intention is unknown: a limited-objective test and a pure-objective test. 60

The

Conroy court characterized these tests as "best interest" tests. 61 In order to withhold
treatment the limited-objective test requires (1) that the decisionmaker find some
"reasonably reliable evidence that [indicates] the patient would have refused the
treatment if competent"62 ... and (2) "that the burdens of administering the treatment
outweigh the benefits of' living in the patient's present condition. 63

The court in

Conroy "defined these burdens as [the] unavoidable pain and suffering that would be
present throughout the remainder of the patient's life."M
The limited-objective test requires some evidence that the patient would not have
wanted the treatment or "would have wanted the treatment terminated." The criteria set
out above for the subjective intent test, however, need not be satisfied. 6S

That is,

"[e]vidence that, taken as a whole, would be too vague, casual, or remote to constitute
the clear proof of the patient's subjective intent ... might be sufficient to satisfy [the
prong] of the limited objective test" requiring evidence that the patient would have
desired termination of treatment.66 The court in 0' Connor noted the testimony of Mrs.
O'Connor's daughter that her mother told her several times "that if she became ill and

60
Note, Barber v. Superior Court: Removing Food And Water From A
Terminally Ill, Comatose Patient -- Who Decides? 17 Sw. V.L. REv. 109, 126
(1987-88) [hereinafter Who Decides] (citing Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at
1231-32).

61

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1231-32.

62 Who Decides, supra note 60, at 127.
63

Id. at 127 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1232

(1985)).

MId.
6S

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1232.

66

Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1232.
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[could not] care for herself she would not want to be sustained" by life-support. 67 This
is an example of the evidence that the decisionmaker should use when applying this
standard.

The limited-objective standard allows for withdrawing or withholding

treatment from an individual who has not sufficiently expressed any intention regarding
the type of treatment to be administered when suffering would only be prolonged by
the administration of such treatment. 6B

Pure-Objective Standard
Conroy provided, finally, that where there is no "trustworthy evidence," or even
evidence at all, that the patient would not have wanted the treatment offered, lifesustaining care may be terminated or withheld if a "pure-objective test" is met. 69 Under
the pure-objective test, the burdens of the individual's life if treatment is given should
"clearly and markedly" override the benefits an individual derives from living.70 Also,
where the "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain" of living with the life-sustaining
treatment makes that type of treatment inhumane, it should be discontinued or withheld
from the patient. 7! No subjective evidence is necessary under this standard. However,
if the patient had previously stated any desire to remain alive despite any suffering or
pain, the treatment should continue. 72 Because there was little or no evidence as to the
pain the patient was experiencing, or would experience, or her ability to feel pleasure,

67

O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 527, 531 N.E.2d 607, 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886,

6B

Who Decides, supra note 60, at 127.

69

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A2d at 1232.

890.

70 Id. at _ , 486 A2d at 1232.
71

Id. at _ , 486 A2d at 1232.

72

Id. at _ , 486 A2d at 1232.
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the court in Conroy refused to apply even this standard.73

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS

In summarizing the evidence that requires consideration in determining whether
one of the three standards -- substitute-intent, limited-objective or pure-objective -- may
be utilized by a substitute decisionmaker, the concurring opinion in O'Connor provided
the seven most significant factors:
(1) the intention of the patient under the eXIstmg circumstances, to
whatever extent it can be ascertained from past expressions; (2) any
moral, ethical, religious or other deeply held belief, insofar as it might
bear on the patient's probable inclinations in the matter; (3) the medical
condition of the patient, including the level of mental and physical
functioning and the degree of pain and discomfort; (4) the nature of the
prescribed medical assistance, including its benefits, risks, invasiveness,
painfulness, and side effects; (5) the prognoses with and without the
medical assistance, including life expectancy, suffering and possibility of
recovery; (6) the sentiments of the family or intimate friend; and (7) the
professional judgment of the involved physicians. 74
When the decisionmaker has applied the above standards, he must then be "manifestly
satisfied" that the facts support the use of one of the substitute intentlbest interest
tests. 75

However, if a petition is brought to a Virginia Circuit Court regarding the

decision that has been reached, the court may "enjoin such action upon finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the action is not lawfully authorized by this section
and that the action is not otherwise authorized by state or federal law. "76 Therefore, the
decision is not free of judicial review if there is disagreement over a choice of

73

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1243.

O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 537, 531 N.E.2d 607, 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886,
896 (1988) (emphasis in original).
74

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985). The Conroy
court analogized to In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, _ , 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981), where
the court required a clear and convincing standard before approval for the
sterilization of a mentally retarded, incompetent adult.
75

76

VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(F) (Supp. 1990).
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treatment.

This should ease the minds of those who fear unfettered decisionmaking

resulting in active or passive euthanasia.77
In closing, the court in Conroy issued a cautionary note to those trying to
implement one of the three standards:
it will frequently be difficult to conclude that the evidence is sufficient

to justify termination of treatment under either of the "best interests" tests.
. .. Often, it is unclear whether and to what extent a patient . . . is
capable of, or is in fact, experiencing pain. Similarly, medical experts
are often unable to determine with any degree of certainty the extent of
a nonverbal person's intellectual functioning or the depth of his emotional
life. When the evidence is insufficient to satisfy either the limitedobjective or pure-objective standard, however, we cannot justify the
termination of life-sustaining treatment as clearly furthering the best
interests of ... [the] patient.78
The court based this final conclusion on the presumption that, "[w]hen evidence of a
person's wishes or physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all,
in favor of preserving life. "79 This statement of public policy ties into the state interests
discussed in the following section. The line between the three tests is not always clear,
nor is the line between the interests of the individuals and those of the state. However,
this may be advantageous because the lines change as the facts change, therefore
providing for specific decisions for specific individuals rather than static rules.

STATE INTERESTS

The three standards providing guidance to a health-care decisionmaker for an
incompetent adult focus almost entirely on the individual.
therefore be balanced against five state interests:

These standards must

(l) preserving life, (2) protecting

innocent third parties, (3) preventing suicide, (4) maintaining the "ethical integrity" of

77

B.

78

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1233.

79

[d. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1233.
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the medical profession,so and (5) the costs of medical care.

As the Conroy court

recognized, the state's interest in preserving life is often considered the most significant
of the five interests.8i

This interest embraces two separate but related concerns:

an

interest in preserving the patient's life and an interest in preserving the sanctity of all
life.82 However, as the dissent in Cruzan noted, the state recognizes a "relativity of
values" concerning life because it often carries out capital punishment and it often
recognizes the "[l]iving [w] ill " which "allows and encourages the pre-planned
termination of life .... "83 Also, as the court in Quinlan observed, the state's interest
in preserving life is neither static nor absolute.

The state interest "weakens and the

individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims."84 Ultimately there is a point where the privacy right of the individual
overcomes the interest of the state. 8S The state interest in preserving life extends to the
protection of innocent third parties.86 The patient's rights "must frequently give way,"
as noted in Conroy, where the exercise of "his choice could adversely and directly
affect the health, safety, or security of others .... "87
Third, the state has an interest in preventing suicide. However, as the court in

so Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking For Incompetents, 29 UCLA
L. REv. 390-91 (1981). See also Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn.
Supp. 127, _ , 482 A.2d 713, 718 (1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486
A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985).
81

Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1233.

82 Cruzan, ex rei. Cruzan by Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en
bane), aff d Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, _ U.S.
_ , 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
83

Id. at 428-29 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).

84 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _ , 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
8S

Id. at _ , 355 A.2d at 664.

86

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985).

87

Id. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1225.
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Foody explained, the cessation of medical treatment does not constitute suicide because

"(I) in refusing treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to die and (2)
even if he did, to the extent that death resulted from natural causes, the patient did not
set the death producing agent in motion with intent to cause his own death. "88 The
traditional definition of suicide is "self-destruction" or "the deliberate termination of
one's own life."89 The actions in these cases clearly do not fall within this defmition.
The fourth state interest concerns safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession. However, as the Conroy court noted, medical ethics have never required
"medical intervention in disease at all costS."90 The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
care have previously been used in deciding whether to terminate "life-sustaining"
treatment. 91 Under this distinction, ordinary care is obligatory and extraordinary care
is optional. The court in Foody defined these terms:
Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations which offer
a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without
excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience. Extraordinary means are
all medicines, treatments and operations which cannot be obtained or used
without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, or if used, would
not offer a reasonable hope of benefit. 92
Therefore, the court concluded that the right to refuse treatment in appropriate
circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores. 93 In fact, surveys have recently
noted that the majority of physicians approve of "passive euthanasia" and believe that
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Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at _ , 482 A.2d at 720.
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BLACK's LAW

DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).

90 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _ , 486 A.2d at 1224.
91 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, _ , 482 A.2d
713, 719 (1984).
92

Id. at _ , 482 A.2d at 719 (quoting KELLy, MEDIe<rMORAL PROBLEMS 129

(1959».
93

Id. at _ , 482 A.2d at 720.
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their colleagues are practicing it. 94

As noted in several decisions, where there is no

"bad faith," doctors will not be held criminally or civilly liable for carrying out the
decision of a substitute decisionmaker. 95
One additional societal interest, the cost of medical care, actually supports
withholding treatment.

Today, some ten-thousand people remain in a persistent

vegetative state. A million and a half more suffer from "severe dementia," and, by the
year 2000, the number of those with the disease is expected to rise by sixty percent.96
Also, a Harvard Medical School report found that there are close to four million more
suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 97 The money that it costs this country to care for
the ten thousand patients in a vegetative state could be used for patients who have
some hope of improving.
The care for Nancy Cruzan alone costs a hundred and thirty thousand dollars a
Her family doesn't pay; the State of Missouri and social security cover her

year.

bills. 98 Her own medical insurance has been exhausted since 1986.99 The dissent in

Cruzan noted that many people die because they cannot afford medical care, and the
state has no desire to help them pay. 100

94

And yet, the State of Missouri appears

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _ , 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985).

95 Id at _ , 486 A.2d at 1242. See also John F. Kennedy Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _, 355
A.2d 647, 666-669 (1976). See generally Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.
3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
96
Hentoff, Does a Loving Family Have the Right to Kill?,
26, 1989, at 20, col. 2.

97

VILLAGE VOICE,
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Id.

98
Id. at 20, col. 1. See also Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427, 429 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting); id. at 432 (Higgins, J., dissenting).

99

100

Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 432 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 429 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
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determined to keep Nancy Cruzan alive for as long as thirty years. 101 No wonder Joyce
Cruzan, Nancy's mother, remains bewildered by the State's unbending position. Joyce
Cruzan recently said: "She [Nancy] would not want that, and yet somebody out there
says, 'It doesn't matter what she wants. It doesn't matter what you want as her family.
The state says life is precious. Therefore, it doesn't matter what you want. It doesn't
matter at all. Nancy doesn't matter. "'102 However, what Virginia must recognize is that
valuable medical resources are dwindling and difficult choices about who should receive
what care must be made.

CONCLUSION

The standards of substitute judgment set forth above should help to balance the
competing interests of individual privacy rights, state interests, and health care costs.
The decisions of other state courts provide the support necessary to fully implement the
Virginia statute approving surrogate decisionmaking. These decisions also give credence
to the fact that Virginia has provided a workable set of standards.

Although the

decisions about medical care for incompetents will continue to be difficult at best, the
Virginia legislature has removed a substantial amount of the uncertainty about who
should make treatment decisions in the case of formerly competent adults.
In the end, the Quinlan court gave perhaps the best reason for implementing the
doctrine of substitute judgment: "We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances,
that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing
prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-

101

Id. at 411.

102

Hentoff, supra note 96 at 20, col. 1.
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support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death."I03

103 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at _ , 355 A.2d at 663.
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APPENDIX A
VA. CODE

ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990) provides:

§ 37.1-134.4. Authorization for providing, withholding, or withdrawing
treatment for certain persons; persons who may authorize exclusions; applicability
restricted to nonprotesting patients. --- A. The procedures for surrogate treatment
decision-making specified in this section shall be available as an alternative to
other statutory and common law authority for making medical decisions on
behalf of adult persons unable to make informed decisions, and health care
providers may, but need not, invoke the procedures authorized herein. This
section shall not affect the law defining the conditions under which consent must
be obtained for medical treatment, or the nature of the consent required.
B. Whenever a licensed physician determines after personal examination
that an adult person, because of mental illness, mental retardation, or any other
mental disorder, or a physical disorder which precludes communication or
impairs judgment, is incapable of making an informed decision about providing,
withholding or withdrawing a specific medical treatment or course of treatment,
the physician may, upon compliance with the provisions of the section, provide
to, withhold, or withdraw from the person that treatment upon the authorization
of any of the following persons, in the specified order of priority, if the
physician is not aware of any available person in a higher class: (i) a person
designated in a writing executed pursuant to § 54.1-2984, if given such authority
in the writing; (ii) a guardian or committee currently authorized to make such
decisions; (iii) an attorney-in-fact appointed under a durable power of attorney,
to the extent the power grants the authority to make such a decision, provided
that the attorney-in-fact is not employed by the physician or the organization
employing the physician; (iv) the spouse; (v) an adult son or daughter; (vi) a
parent; (vii) an adult brother or sister; or (viii) any other relative of the person
in the descending order of blood relationship. For the purposes of the section,
the durable power of attorney may provide that it is effective during or only
during a period in which the principal, because of a physical or mental
disability, as determined by the provider of that treatment. For purposes of this
section, "incapable of making an informed decision" means unable to understand
the nature, extent or probable consequences of a proposed medical decision, or
unable to make a rational evaluation of the risks and benefits of the proposed
decision as compared with the risks and benefits of alternatives to that decision.
For purposes of this section, persons who are deaf, dysphasic or have other
communication disorders but who are otherwise mentally competent and able to
communicate by means other than speech shall not be considered incapable of
giving informed consent.
C.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to authorize
non therapeutic sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, or admission to a mental
retardation facility or psychiatric hospital, as defined in § 37.1-1; however, the
provisions of this section, if otherwise applicable, may be employed to authorize
a specific treatment or course of treatment for a person who has been lawfully
admitted to such a facility.
D. The provisions of the section shall not authorize providing, continuing
to provide, withholding or withdrawing of treatment if the provider of the
treatment knows or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know that such an action
is protested by the person. No person enumerated in subsection B of this
section shall authorize, pursuant to this section, treatment, or a course of
treatment, that such person knows, or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know,
is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the person unable to make
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a decision, whether expressed orally or in writing.
E. Prior to the initiation or cessation of treatment for which authorization
has been obtained or will be sought pursuant to this section, and no less
frequently than every 180 days while the treatment continues, the physician shall
obtain a written certification that the person in incapable of making an informed
decision regarding the treatment. This certification shall be made by a licensed
physician or licensed clinical psychologist who is not otherwise currently
involved in the treatment of the person assessed and shall be based on a
personal examination of the person. The cost of the assessment shall be
considered for all purposes a cost of the treatment provided.
F. On petition of any person to the circuit court of the county or city
in which resides or is located any person for whom treatment will be or is
currently being provided, withheld or withdrawn under the purported authority
of this section, the court may enjoin such action upon finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the action is not lawfully authorized by this
section and that the action is not otherwise authorized by state or federal law.
G. No person or facility providing, withholding or withdrawing treatment
pursuant to the authorization obtained pursuant to this section shall incur liability
arising out of a claim to the extent the claim is based on lack of consent or
authorization for such action.
H. No person authorizing treatment pursuant to this section shall be
liable for the cost of treatment solely on the basis of that authorization. No
person giving authorization pursuant to this section shall incur liability arising
out of a claim of breach of duty to the person receiving treatment, provided that
the person giving consent (i) prior to giving consent, makes a good faith effort
to ascertain the risks and benefits of and alternatives to the treatment and the
religious beliefs and basic values of the person receiving treatment, and to
inform the person, to the extent possible, of the proposed treatment and the fact
that someone else is authorized to make a decision regarding that treatment; and
(ii) bases his decision on the best interest of the person, taking into account the
person's religious beliefs and basic values and any preferences previously
expressed by the person regarding such treatment.
I. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the right to use, and
the authority conferred by, any other applicable statutory or regulatory procedure
relating to the authorization of providing, withholding or withdrawing treatment,
or to diminish any common law authority of a physician to provide, withhold,
or withdraw treatment to a person unable to make an informed decision about
the providing, withholding or withdrawing of that treatment, with or without the
consent of the person's relative.
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APPENDIX B

Virginia does not provide a form for executing a Durable Power of Attorney For
Health Care. However, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2205 to -2209 (1989) provides a
sample draft of a Health Care Power of Attorney.

§ 21-2205. Durable power of attorney for health care.

(a) A competent adult may designat~, in writing, an individual who
shall be empowered to make health-care decisions on behalf of the
competent adult, if the competent adult becomes incapable, by reason of
mental disability, of making or communicating a choice regarding a
particular health-care decision.
(b) A durable power of attorney for health care shall include language
which clearly communicates that the principal intends the attorney in fact
to have the authority to make health-care decisions on behalf of the
principal and shall include language identical or substantially similar to
the following:
(1) "This power of attorney shall not be affected by the subsequent
incapacity of the principal. "; or
(2) "This power of attorney becomes effective upon the incapacity
of the principal."
(c) A durable power of attorney for health care shall be dated and
signed by the principal and 2 adult witnesses who affIrm that the
principal was of sound mind and free from duress at the time of signing.
The 2 adult witnesses shall not include the principal, the health-care
provider of the principal or an employee of the health-care provider of
the principal.
(d) Of the 2 adult witnesses referred to in § 21-2204(c), at least 1 shall
not be related to the principal by blood, marriage or adoption and shall
not be entitled to any part of the estate of the principal by a current will
or operation of law.
(e) Any durable power of attorney executed ... and specifically written
to include health-care decision making after incompetency shall be
effective, if the execution of the prior document meets the requirements
of this chapter.

§ 21-2206.

Rights and duties of attorney in fact

(a) Subject to any express limitations in the durable power of attorney
for health care, an attorney in fact shall have all the rights, powers and
authority related to health-care decisions that the principal would have
under District and federal law. This authority shall include, at a
minimum:
(1) The authority to grant, refuse or withdraw consent to the
provision of any health-care service, treatment, or procedure;
(2) The right to review the health care records of the principal;
(3) The right to be provided with all information necessary to
make informed health-care decisions;
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(4) The authority to select and discharge health-care professionals;
and
(5) The authority to make decisions regarding admission to or
discharge from health-care facilities and to take any lawful actions
. that may be necessary to carry out these decisions.
(b)
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and
unless a durable· power of attorney for health care provides otherwise, the
designated attorney in fact, if known to a health-care provider to be
available and willing to make a particular health-care decision, shall have
priority over any other person to act for the principal in all matters
regarding health care.
(2) A designated attorney in fact shall not have the authority to
make a particular health-care decision, if the principal is able to
give or withhold informed consent with respect to that decision.
(c) In exercising authority under a durable power of attorney for health
care, the attorney in fact shall have a duty to act in accordance with:
(1) The wishes of the principal as expressed in the durable power
of attorney for health care; or
(2) The good faith belief of the attorney in fact as to the best
interests of the principal, if the wishes of the principal are
unknown and cannot be ascertained.
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall affect any right that an attorney in fact
may have, independent of the designation in a durable power of attorney
for health care, to make or otherwise participate in health-care decisions
on behalf of the principal.

§ 21-2207. Forms for creating a durable power of attorney for health
care.

Any written form meeting the requirements of § 21-2205 may be used
to create a durable power of attorney for health care. The following is
offered as a sample form only and its inclusion in this section shall not
be construed to preclude the use of alternative language:

INFORMATION ABOUT lliIS DOCUMENT
lHIS IS AN IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCUMENT.
BEFORE
SIGNING lHIS DOCUMENT, IT IS VITAL FOR YOU TO KNOW
AND UNDERSTAND THESE FACTS:
lHIS DOCUMENT GIVES THE PERSON YOU NAME AS YOUR
ATTORNEY IN FACT THE POWER TO MAKE HEALlli-CARE
DECISIONS FOR YOU IF YOU CANNOT MAKE THE DECISIONS
FOR YOURSELF.
AFIER YOU HAVE SIGNED lHIS DOCUMENT, YOU HAVE
THE RIGHT TO MAKE HEALlli-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOURSELF
IF YOU ARE MENTALLY COMPETENT TO DO SO. IN ADDmON,
AFIER YOU HAVE SIGNED lHIS DOCUMENT, NO TREATMENT
MA Y BE GIVEN TO YOU OR STOPPED OVER YOUR OBJECTION
IF YOU ARE MENTALLY COMPETENT TO MAKE THAT
DECISION.
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YOU MAYSTATE IN THIS DOCUMENT ANY TYPE OF
TREATMENT THAT YOU DO NOT DESIRE AND ANY THAT YOU
WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU RECEIVE.
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE AWA Y THE AUTHORITY OF
YOUR ATTORNEY IN FACT, UNLESS YOU HAVE BEEN
ADJUDICATED INCOMPETENT, BY NOTIFYING YOUR ATTORNEY
IN FACT OR HEALTH-CARE PROVIDER EITHER ORALLY OR IN
WRITING. SHOULD YOU REVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF YOUR
ATTORNEY IN FACT, IT IS ADVISABLE TO REVOKE IN WRITING
AND TO PLACE COPIES OF THE REVOCAnON WHEREVER THIS
DOCUMENT IS LOCATED.
IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN THIS DOCUMENT THAT YOU DO
NOT UNDERSTAND, YOU SHOULD ASK A SOCIAL WORKER,
LAWYER, OR OTHER PERSON TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU.

*****
YOU SHOULD KEEP A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT AFIER YOU
HAVE SIGNED IT. GIVE A COpy TO THE PERSON YOU NAME
AS YOUR ATTORNEY IN FACT. IF YOU ARE IN A HEALTHCARE FACILITY, A COpy OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN YOUR MEDICAL RECORD.

POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE
I, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " hereby appoint:

name

home address

home telephone number
work telephone number
as my attorney in fact to make health-care decisions for me if I become
unable to make my own health-care decisions. This gives my attorney
in fact the power to grant, refuse, or withdraw consent on my behalf for
any health-care service, treatment or procedure. My attorney in fact also
has the authority to talk to healtb-carepersonnel, get information and sign
forms necessary to carry out these decisions.
If the person named as my attorney in fact is not available or is
unable to act as my attorney in fact, I appoint the following person to
serve in the order listed below:
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1.
name

home address

home telephone number
work telephone number

2.
name

home address

home telephone number
work telephone number
With this document, I intend to create a power of attorney for health
care, which shall take effect if I become incapable of making my own
health-care decisions and shall continue during that incapacity.
My attorney in fact shall make health-care decisions as I direct below
or as I make known to my attorney in fact in some other way.
(a) STAlEMENT OF DIRECTIVES CONCERNING LIFEPROLONGING
CARE,
TREATMENT,
SERVICES,
AND
PROCEDURES:

(b) SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND LIMITATIONS:

BY MY SIGNATURE I INDICATE THAT I UNDERSTAND TIIE
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.
I sign my name to this form on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(date)
at:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (address).
(Signature )
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WITNESSES
I declare that the person who signed or acknowledged this document
is personally known to me, that the person signed or acknowledged this
durable power of attorney for health care in my presence, and that the
person appears to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue
influence. I am not the person appointed as the attorney in fact by this
document, nor am I the health-care provider of the principal or an
employee of the health-care provider of the principal.
First Witness
Signature:
Home Address:
Print Name:
Date:
Second Witness
Signature:
Home Address:
Print Name:
Date:
(AT LEAST 1 OF THE WITNESSES LISTED ABOVE SHALL ALSO
SIGN THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION.)
I further declare that I am not related to the principal by blood,
marriage or adoption, and, to the best of my knowledge, I am not entitled
to any part of the estate of the principal under a currently existing will
or by operation of law.
Signature:
Signature:

§ 21-2208. Revocation.

(a) At any time that the principal has the capacity to create a durable
power of attorney for health care, the principal may:
(1) Revoke the appointment of the attorney in fact under a durable
power of attorney for health care by notifying the attorney in fact
orally or in writing; or
(2) Revoke the authority to make health-care decisions granted to
the attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health
care by notifying the health-care provider orally or in writing.
(b) If a health-care provider is notified of a revocation pursuant to
subsection (a)(2) of this section, the health-care provider shall document
this fact in the patient-care records of the principal and make a reasonable
effort to notify the attorney in fact of the revocation.
(c) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of
proof, that a principal has the capacity to revoke a durable power of
attorney for health care.
(d) Unless it expressly provides otherwise, a valid durable power of
attorney for health care revokes any prior durable power of attorney for
health-care decisions only.
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(e) Unless a durable power of attorney for health care expressly
provides otherwise, and after its execution the marriage of the principal
is dissolved or annulled, the dissolution or annulment shall automatically
revoke a designation of the former spouse as an attorney in fact to make
health-care decisions for the principal. If a designation is revoked solely
on account of this subsection, it shall be revived by the remarriage of the
principal to the former spouse but may be subsequently revoked by an
act of the principal.

§ 21-2209. Health-care provider limitation.

(a) No health-care provider may require an individual to execute a
durable power of attorney for health care as a condition for the provision
of health-care services or admission to a health-care facility, as defined
in Statute 32-1301.
(b) After an individual has spent at least 48 hours in a health care
facility, a health care provider may request the individual to execute a
durable power of attorney for health care subject to the limitations set
forth in this chapter. The health care provider may not be named as the
attorney in fact.
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APPENDIX C
VIRGINIA LIVING WilL STATUTE
VA. CODE ANN.

§ 54.1-2984 (Supp. 1990).

Suggested fonn of written declaration.
A declaration executed pursuant to this
article may, but need not, be in one of the following fonns, and may include other
specific directions including, but not limited to, a designation of another person to make
the treatment decision for the declarant should he be (i) diagnosed as suffering from a
tenninal condition and (ii) comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically
incapable of communication. Should any other specific directions be held to be invalid,
such invalidity shall not affect the declaration.
(month, year). I,
Declaration made this __ day of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " willfully and voluntarily make known my desire and do
hereby declare:

CHOOSE ONLY ONE OF THE NEXT TWO PARAGRAPHS AND CROSS
THROUGH THE OTHER
If at any time I should have a tenninal condition and my attending
physician has detennined that there can be no recovery from such condition, my death
is imminent, and I am comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically
to make a decision
incapable of communication, I designate
on my behalf as to whether life prolonging procedures shall be withheld or withdrawn.
In the event that my designee decides that such procedures should be withheld or
withdrawn, I wish to be pennitted to die naturally with only the administration of
medication or the perfonnance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
me with comfort care or to alleviate pain.

OR
If at any time I should have a tenninal condition and my attending
physician has detennined that there can be no recovery from such condition and my
death is imminent, where the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only
to artificially prolong the dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or
withdrawn, and that I be pennitted to die naturally with only the administration of
medication or the perfonnance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
me with comfort care or to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such
life-prolonging procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by
my family and physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or
surgical treatment and accept the consequences of such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this declaration.
(Signed)
The declarant is known to me and I believe him or her to be of sound mind.
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RACIALL Y DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS AND THE
CY PRES DOCTRINE IN VIRGINIA
James W. Reynolds

INTRODUCTION

The recent Virginia Supreme Court decision, Hermitage Methodist Homes of

Virginia v. Dominion Trust Company/ has again focused attention on the cy pres
doctrine and its ability to reform charitable trusts that discriminate. Charitable trusts,
like all trusts, are "administered according to the trustor's intent as expressed in the
trust instrument or will."2 One danger that exists in charitable trusts, however, which
does not exist in private trusts, is that charitable trusts have a potentially infinite life
because they are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities.3 Because society and laws
can change over a period of years, a formally "non-discriminatory" charitable trust can
lose its specific purpose or become obsolete.4 Cy pres, which literally means "as near,"
allows a court to revise a charitable trust, as long as the settlor has a general charitable

1
Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia v. Dominion Trust Co., 239 Va. 46,
387 S.E.2d 740 (1990), cert. denied sub nom. Prince Edward School Foundation v.
Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, _ U.S. _ , 111 S. Ct. 277 (1990).

2 Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the
Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REv. 635, 635 (1988) [hereinafter Charitable
Efficiency].
3

[d. at 635.

4
See Campbell v. Board of Trustees of the James Barry-Robinson Home for
Boys, 220 Va. 516, 260 S.E.2d 204 (1979) (testamentary trust creating a "Home and
School of Arts and Trades for Orphan Boys" was altered to allow the school to
become a private prepatory school and later a residential treatment center because,
among other reasons, so few boys could meet the orphan, religious, and residency
requirements).
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intent, in order to "meet unforeseen emergencies or changed circumstances that threaten
the trust's existence."s
This article will examine how the cy pres doctrine is applied to Virginia trusts
that contain racially-discriminatory provisions. First, it gives a brief account of the cy
pres doctrine's history and then focuses on how cy pres generally works. The article
then examines the application of cy pres to Virginia trusts containing raciallydiscriminatory provisions. 6

Finally, it concludes with the general formalities to be

observed when using the cy pres doctrine.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CY PRES DOCTRINE

The English common law provided for prerogative and judicial cy pres doctrines. 7
Under the judicial doctrine of cy pres, the courts attempt to fulfill the settlor's intentions
"as nearly" as practicable. 8 The judicial cy pres doctrine is generally accepted, though

S In Re Estate of Wilson: Judicial Reformation of Discriminatory Charitable
Trusts, 5 PACE L. REv. 433, 442 (1985) [hereinafter Judicial Reformation]; see also
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).

If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable

purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust
will not fail but the court will
direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.

Id.
6
Courts are more reluctant to use the cy pres doctrine to reform gender and
religious discrimination in charitable trusts. In these instances, the courts may refuse
to find state action though the state has some involvement in the trust, or the courts
will reform the trust by removing the state action instead of excising the
discriminatory restriction. See generally Luria, Prying Loose the Dead Hand of the
Past: How Courts Apply Cy Pres to Race, Gender, and Religiously Restricted Trusts,
21 U.S.F. L. REv. 41, 54 (1986).

7

SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF TIlE LAW OF TRUSTS

8

Id.
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§ 399.1 (1960).

sometimes reluctantly, in the United States.9

Conflicting with the desire to fulfill

the testator's wishes, the prerogative doctrine of cy pres enabled the king, in his role
as parens patriae, to deliver, in certain cases, the "property for any charitable purpose"
he desired. lo

In exercising his prerogative, the king had no duty to consider the

testator's wishes;l1 he would merely indicate to the Chancellor how he desired the
property to be disposed.1 2 The king's prerogative powers under the cy pres doctrine
could sometimes lead to grave abuses of the testator's intentions. 13 Because of such
abuses, the prerogative cy pres doctrine is not recognized in the United States. 14
Despite American courts' disapproval of the prerogative cy pres doctrine, as American
philanthropy increased at the end of the 1800's, the courts were less reluctant to use
the judicial cy pres doctrine, especially as some "charitable donors" left their gifts to
select groups in society. IS

9

Luria, supra note 6, at 45.

10 SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 714.
11

[d. at 715.

12

[d.

13 Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228 (1754) (Jewish testator left sum of money
in trust for the establishment of an assembly "for reading the Jewish law and
instructing people in the Jewish religion." The trust was held unlawful) (cited in
SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 715). During this period in England, such a gift was illegal
because it promoted a religion contrary to the established religion. The king, using
his prerogative powers, directed the fund be used to support a preacher in the
Foundling Hospital and to "instruct the children in that institution in the Christian
religion." SCO'IT, supra, at 715.
14 SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 715.
IS

Luria, supra note 6, at 45.
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GENERAL APPLICAnON OF THE CY PRES DOCfRINE

The cy pres doctrine cannot be used to change the settlor's bequest merely to
suit the "desires or convenience of the trustee."16 Under the cy pres doctrine, courts can
revise charitable trusts when social or legal changes threaten the trust with
nullification. 17

Courts will delete the offending provisions of the threatened trust,

however, only when they can find a general charitable intent within the trust, showing
that the settlor's "primary purpose was to aid humanity as a whole."18 If the settlor
depicts no general charitable intent and the trust's original purpose becomes illegal,
impossible, or impracticable, then the trust will fail. 19
In applying the cy pres doctrine, most courts use a "standard three-part
analysis. "211 First, the trust must be a valid charitable trust,21 meaning that it has met
the formalities for creating a charitable trust. Second, the court must find that the intent
of the trustor is hindered to such an extent that cy pres modification is justified.21
Finally, the court must find a manifestation of the settlor's general charitable intent

16

Judicial Reformation, supra note 5, at 444.

17 Luria, supra note 6, at 41. See also Smith v. Moore 225 F. Supp. 434
(E.D. Va. 1963) (The court concluded that because there was no forfeiture provision
for non-compliance with the directions of the trust then the settlor did not intend
explicit directions), modified, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965).
18 Luria, supra note 6, at 41.
19

[d.

211

See Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642.

21 See id; see also
21

REsTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TRUSTS

See Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642.
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§ 399 comment a (1959).

within the trust. 23 The court in Smith v. MoorfiM interpreted Virginia's cy pres statute,
enacted in 1946, as adopting this three-part analysis.
Before invoking the cy pres doctrine, whether by statute or through the
medium known as judicial power, it is necessary that there be (1) a valid
charitable trust without a gift over, (2) an existing general charitable
intent, and (3) the beneficiaries must be indefinite or uncertain, or (4) the
purpose of the trust must be indefinite, impossible to perform, or so
impracticable of performance as to characterize the fulfillment of the
purpose as "impossible.'1'25
Section § 55-31 of the Virginia Code26 is designed to enforce charitable trusts and to
prevent their failure if specific performance is impossible.27
"General charitable intent" is the element in this three-part analysis that creates
the most cy pres litigation.28

In Virginia, charitable gifts are "viewed with peculiar

favor by the courts, and every presumption consistent with the language contained in
the instruments of gift will be employed in order to sustain them. "29 In determining

23

[d.; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS

§ 399 (1959).

225 F. Supp. 434 (B.D. Va. 1963) (The sum of money provided in the trust
was inadequate to fulfill the specific intention of the trust, the construction of a free
hospital. The cy pres doctrine was used to fulfill the testators' intentions "as nearly
as" possible by using the trust to build a wing onto an existing hospital and using
this wing as a free clinic), modified, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965).
2A

25

[d. at 441 (emphasis added).

26

VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-31 (1950):
When any . . . person gives . . . any real or personal property in trust
to or for any educational, charitable, or eleemosynary purpose, the
indefiniteness . . . of the beneficiaries named . . . or the indefiniteness
of the purpose of the trust itself, shall not defeat any such trust and, if
the trust is in other respects valid under the laws of this State, it shall
be administered to conform as near as may be to the purpose for
which created or, if impossible of performance for this purpose, for
some other educational, charitable, benevolent or eleemosynary
purpose.

27 Smith, 224 F. Supp. at 447.
28

Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642.

29 Thomas v. Bryant, 185 Va. 845, 852, 40 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1946), (citing
Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary Society, 375 lll. 220, _ , 30 N.E.2d 657, 663
(1940).
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whether the settlor has a general charitable intent, Virginia law has accepted many of
the positions in Section 399 of the Second Restatement of Trusts. 30 Smith 31 embraces
the Restatement's position that terms like "property shall be devoted 'forever' to a
particular purpose, or ... shall be devoted to that purpose 'and no other purpose,' or
that the property is given 'upon condition' that it be applied to that purpose, does not
necessarily indicate the absence of a more general charitable intention of the settlor
• • • "32

Such terms can act merely as an emphasis that the settlor wants the property

to be applied for no other purposes "as long as it is possible and practicable and legal
to apply it to the specified purpose . . .. "33 These terms do not necessarily indicate
that the trust should end if it becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal to achieve
the trust's particular purpose.34

Smith35 also accepts the Restatement's position that it is easier to establish a
general charitable intention when the trust is possible and legal at the outset and
becomes impossible or illegal at a later date, than it is when the trust fails at the
outset. 36 With this former circumstance, the courts can fairly infer that the settlor must
have expected circumstances to change over a period of time and that his particular
purpose may not be achieved. 37 The courts presume that a settlor would want his trust

30

Smith, 225 F. Supp. at 441-42.

31

Id. at 441.

32

RFsrA'ffiMENT

33

Id.

(SECOND)

OF

TRUSTS § 399 comment c (1959).

OF

TRUSTS § 399 comment i (1959).

34 Id.
35

225 F. Supp. at 442.

36

RFsrA'rnMENT

37

Id.

(SECOND)
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to be modified, rather than fail and possibly be distributed among heirs he may not
know. 38
Finally, Smith39 accepts the Restatement's position that the trust will be modified
to achieve its purpose, as nearly as possible, when the amount provided for the
charitable purpose is too small, rriaking it impossible for the trust to accomplish its
goal.4O The court will do this only if there is first a general charitable intent in the
trust. In Smith, the court, in determining whether the settlor had a general charitable
intent, stated that "the background of the testator, his interest and spirit in community
projects, his education and business acumen, may all be considered," unless forbidden
by the explicit terms in the trust. 41

THE CY PRES DOCfRINE AND RACIALLY-DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS

State Action
In order to apply the cy pres doctrine, a court must determine that the following
conditions have been met:

(1) the settlor has made a valid charitable trust, (2) the

terms of the charitable trust are not "impossible to perform" or so impracticable as to
make the trust impossible to perform or illegal, and (3) the settlor had a general
charitable intent. 42
provides that:

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States; nor shall any State ... deny

38

·Id.

39

225 F. Supp. at 442.

40

REsTATEMENT

41

Smith, 225 F. Supp. at 442.

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment j (1959).

42
Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Va. 1963), modified, 343 F.2d
594 (4th Cir. 1965).
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to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "43 A private trust
is illegal when it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because either "the institution administering the trust is itself a state agency,44 or
because the trust is intertwined with the state. "4S
In Shelley v. Kraemer,46 the Court held that section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to private conduct even if the conduct is discriminatory or
wrongfu1. 47

Thus, restrictive agreements between private parties do not violate any

rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.48

The Fourteenth Amendment

applies solely to actions taken by a state.49 However, the Court in Shelley found that
actions taken by a state court and its judicial officers, in their official capacities, are
state actions within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. so

Therefore, any acts

performed by a state's legislative, judicial, or executive branches will be considered
state actions governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is doubtless true that a State
may act through different agencies, either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities; and the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] amendment extend to all actions of

43

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

44 Luria, supra note 6, at 51.
4S

[d. at 52.

46
334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948) (Private agreements, based on race, to exclude
persons from use or occupancy of real estate for residential purposes do not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated if state courts enforce these agreements).

47

[d. at 13.

48

[d.

49

[d. at 8.

so [d. at 14.
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the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these
agencies or by another."Sl
In Evans v. Newton,Sl a tract of land was bequeathed to the city of Macon,
Georgia, as a park for white persons only. When the city desegregated the park, the
all-white Board of Managers for the park brought suit against the city, asking for the
removal of the city as trustee. The Georgia trial court accepted the city's resignation
as trustee for the park and appointed three "private" trustees, who contended that they
could enforce the racial restrictions of the trust On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court decided, however, that services which are "municipal in nature," such as those
rendered by a park, are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. s3
The key factor in this case was the fact that "municipal control and maintenance" had
been provided for so long that merely replacing the city as trustee was insufficient to
rid the park of its public character. 54 In its decision, the court recognized that "conduct
that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so
impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action. "ss

Racially Discriminatory Trusts
The cy pres doctrine allows courts to modify trusts that have become illegal,
unless the settlor intended that the trust property be used solely towards that illegal
purpose. S6 In Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia v. Dominion Trust Company,SI

Sl Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
Sl

382 U.S. 296 (1966).

S3

[d. at 301-02.

54

[d. at 301.

ss [d. at 299.
S6

REsTAlEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 399 (1959).

169

the settlor had provided in his will that his estate would be held in trust and that the
income from his estate would go to a private school, as long as the school admitted
white students only.sa The trust contained successive "gift overs," so that if the first
school admitted any non-white students, the trust's income would go to a second private
school. If the second private school admitted any non-white students, the trust income
would go to a third private school. 59 The final beneficiary of the trust was a nursing
home, and no racial restriction was attached to that gift provision. 60
In Hermitage Homes, the court found without discussion that the racial restriction
was unenforceable because state courts, under the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot
enforce racial restrictions. 61

The court, however, did not use the cy pres doctrine. to

revise the trust, which would have allowed the first school designated to take the
income, because-* due to the "gift over" provision, there was no uncertainty in deciding
who benefitted, and the need to fmd a general charitable intent was thus eliminated.62
Furthermore, because the offending language could not be excised from the trust
without changing its essential nature and quality, the gift to the educational charities
failed completely.63 The "gift over" to the nursing home, which did not contain a racial

S7
239 Va. 46, 387 S.E.2d 740 (1990), cert denied sub nom., Prince Edward
U.S. _ , 111 S.
School Foundation v. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, _
Ct. 277 (1990).

sa [d. at 49-50, 387 S.E.2d at 741-42.
59

[d. at 50, 387 S.E.2d at 742.

60

[d.

61 [d. at 54-55, 387 S.E.2d at 744. The court found that the purpose of the
trust was to educate white children only and not children generally.
62

[d. at 58, 387 S.E.2d at 747.

63 [d. at 57, 387 S.E.2d at 746.
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restriction, was valid and ensured that there was no indefiniteness as to the trust's
purpose. 64
In United States v. Hughes Memorial Home,6S the cy pres doctrine was applied
to revise a trust. The Hughes Memorial Home was a private non-sectarian home for
children. The home was established by a trust which provided that the home was for
white children in Virginia and North Carolina. The district court found that the home,
due to its discrimination against black children, violated the Fair Housing Act.66 The
court further held that the racial restriction was merely incidental to the main purpose
of the trust, which was to provide shelter for orphaned children. 67 Finding that Virginia
state law favored the use of cy pres "to permit continuation of charitable trusts in the
face of changed conditions . . . ," the court decided that the home was entitled to
continue its operation, as long as it ignored the racial restrictions in the trust. 68

GENERAL FORMALITIES FOR USING THE CY PRES DOCTRINE

There is a general procedure for employing the cy pres doctrine when it has
been determined that a settlor has a general charitable intent but that some of the trust's
provisions are illegal, impracticable, or impossible. 69 First, the party seeking to amend
the trust should ask the court to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable
intent. 70 The court may then "refer the matter to a master," who will devise a scheme

64

[d. at 58, 387 S.E.2d at 747.

6S

396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975).

66

[d. at 549.

67

[d. at 552.

68

[d. at 552-53.

69

SCO'IT, ABRIDGEMENT

70

[d. at 714.

OF THE LAW OF

TRUSTS § 399 (1960).
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for applying the property, which the court can accept, reject, or modify.71

If the

problem is relatively simple, the court may devise its own scheme or adopt one of the
trustee's suggested schemes.72 A trustee should not try to apply the cy pres doctrine
without first seeking the court's instructions.1'3 If, however, the trustee does employ his
own scheme before asking the court for directions, the court may let it stand if the
court approves of the scheme as implemented.74

Additionally, the state's attomey-

general is required to be a party to any determination on how cy pres will be applied;
the court, however, will always determine the proper scheme to be employed.7s

CONCLUSION

Section 55-31 of the Virginia Code76 provides that when a charitable trust has
an uncertain beneficiary or purpose, or is impossible, the cy pres doctrine can be
employed to make the trust conform "as near as may be to the purpose for which it
was created."77 Generally, when a charitable trust contains a racial restriction, the court
will determine that the trust is invalid because enforcing such a restriction would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If, however, the court
finds that the testator had a general charitable intent, which is not limited by the racial
restriction, the court will revise the charitable trust by removing the racial restriction.
This will ensure that the testator's general charitable intentions will be carried out.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

7S

Id.

76

VA.

CoDE

ANN. § 55-31 (1950).

77 Id.; see supra note 26.
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However, if the settlor does not have a general charitable intent and includes a racial
restriction in a charitable trust, the trust will fail.
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THE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT:
VIRGINIA'S RESPONSE TO FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT REFORM
Anne D. Bowling
INTRODUCfION: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
IN CHILD SUPPORT LAW
One criticism of the United States' traditional societal treatment of children's
issues is that it focuses upon specific perceived problems of individual groups of
children, rather than a "comprehensive family social policy which truly promotes the
well-being of all children or attempts to guarantee that all children receive consistent
nurture and adequate financial support. "1 Through the last half of the twentieth century,
issues of support and welfare for all children have grown significantly in importance.
As recognition of the need for child support grew, it did so exclusively at the
state level, with the federal government adopting a policy of abstention from the entire
realm of domestic relations. This precluded the federal court system from interfering
with state courts' imposition of child support awards. 2
Although federal courts had not historically played a part in developing the field
of family law, Congress began legislating in order to remedy inadequacies in the states'
systems of governing family relations. 3 Escalating costs in the federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFOC) program focused Congress' attention on child support

1

Howe, Who Speaketh for the Child?, 23 N. ENG. L. REv. 421, 422 (1988).

2
Note, Bankruptcy: Including a Child Support Arrearage in a Chapter 13
Plan, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477, 483 (1986) [hereinafter Chapter 13 Plan]. This
abstention has constitutional foundations. Since the Tenth Amendment reserves for
the states "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States," U.S. CONST. amend. X, and the powers to legislate in
the areas of family and domestic matters are not specifically granted to Congress by
Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution (enumerating Congress' powers), the jurisdiction to
control domestic relations lies with the states. Chapter 13 Plan, supra, at 483 n.34.
3
Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 99, 99 (1983)
[hereinafter Reflections].
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enforcement problems at the state level. 4 By 1975, Congress had enacted laws which
would effectively override state laws in the domestic relations field. s
The federal government entered the area of child support both because of
recognition of the subject's importance,6 and because of the states' failure to provide
for the needs of children.7

A major problem with the states' systems was the

inadequacy of the support orders issued by the state courts.8

As a result, custodial

parents, usually mothers of the children needing support, were faced with a grossly
disproportionate share of child-raising expenses, creating a "feminization and cradlization
of poverty. "9
Another problem with the state courts' exclusive jurisdiction over child support
matters was the inconsistency with which child support orders were determined. State
statutes governing child support provided little guidance to judges determining levels of
support that were fair to all concerned parties. to The resulting support awards could

4
Id. The AFDC program is a federally-funded means of support for families
with dependent children. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.

S Reflections, supra note 3, at 99 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-60 (1976». The laws of the United States are the
"supreme Law of the Land," see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and a federal law
preempts state law if the state law's effect is to interfere with Congress' purpose in
legislating in a particular area. Chapter 13 Plan, supra note 2, at 483 n.34.

6 Historically, children are one of the groups with the most need for support,
as well as the most deserving. Of those individuals living below standards of
poverty, children are, clearly, the least r\.;sponsible for their situation. Giampetro,
Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child Support Payments: Stated Objectives,
Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM. L.Q. 373, 373 n.l (1986).
7

See Reflections, supra note 3, at 99.

Woods, Child Support: A National Disgrace, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 538, 538
(Oct. 1983); Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support
Guidelines in the States, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 213 (1988).
8

9

10

Brackney, supra note 8, at 199.
Giampetro, supra note 6, at 377.
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easily reflect judges' own policy preferences II more than the needs of the children
involved and their parents' ability to provide for them. The inconsistency of this "caseby-case method" had the potential to contribute to the tensions and hostility already
present in a divorce situation. 12 As a result, non-custodial parents, feeling that they had
received unfair treatment by the court system, were less likely to comply with the
order. 13
Parental noncompliance was the third major difficulty with the state courts' child
support systems. 14

Census bureau reports from 1984 (when Congress increased the

strength of states' powers to enforce child support)15 estimated the amount of overdue
child support payments at forty billion dollars annually.16 In fact, almost a third of the
ordered support was never received by the custodial parents. 17 One commentator has
suggested that the federal government's AFDC system was viewed as an alternative to
parents providing support. 18 The skyrocketing costs of this system, however, finally
brought home to Congress the need for the government to take a more active role in
the process of determining and enforcing non-custodial parents' duties to take financial
responsibility for their children. 19

II

Id.

12 Brackney, supra note 8, at 200.
13 Id.
14 Howe, supra note 1, at 423; Woods, supra note 8, at 538.
15

See infra notes 50 to 53 and accompanying text.

16 Note, Constitutional Implications of the C;hild Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984, 24 J. FAM. L. 301, 301 (1986) [hereinafter Implications] (citing
The Courier-Journal, Sept. 15, 1984, at A16, col. 1).
11 Woods, supra note 8, at 538.
18 Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the
Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (Spring 1990) [hereinafter Private Responsibility].
19

Ref/ections, supra note 3, at 99.
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Another commentator has drawn an illustrative parallel between the need for
governmental coordination of child support enforcement programs and the centralization
of workers' compensation laws.20

Before the current worker's compensation system,

employees seeking recoupment for job-related injuries often faced obstacles similar to
custodial parents seeking child support through the courts. Insufficient funds to hire
legal assistance and prepare cases adequately, lengthy court delays restricting the
availability of much-needed funds, and widely varying awards for similar cases were
complaints common to both sets of plaintiffs.

Also inherent to both situations were

bogged-down court systems struggling to manage exploding caseloads?1 The solution
for injured employees was a federal worker's compensation program.

A similarly

centralized federal program for child support would not only coordinate and establish
state enforcement programs, but would also oversee their operation to ensure that the
programs are implemented in accordance with the law. 22

FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE CHILD SUPPORT INITIATIVES

The Social Security Act of 1935
Federal statutory intervention in the child support area began as early as the
Depression, though in a limited manner. The Social Security Act of 1935 included a
section that established the provision of funds to impoverished mothers to help them
care for their dependent children. This was the birth of AFDC. 23 The Act also required

20 Henry & Swartz, Expedited Processes For Child Support Enforcement, 36
Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 77, 81 (Fall 1985).
21

Id.

Note, Child Support Enforcement: Balancing Increased Federal Involvement
with Procedural Due Process, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 687, 688 (1985) [hereinafter
Increased Federal Involvement].
22

23 Id. at 691-92; Baker & Stuff, The Costs and Benefits of Child Support
Enforcement, 18 PROSEClTl"OR, J. NAT'L DIST. ATT'ys A. 27, 27 (Winter 1984).
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non-custodial parents to contribute child support payments on behalf of their children,
but provided no effective means to enforce this obligation. 2A

URESA: Interstate Enforcement of Support Orders
In 1950, the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws gave
state courts more power to enforce support orders from other states through the approval
of the Unifonn Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).2.5

Every state has

adopted a fonn of this model statute,26 and most states have since adopted the Revised
Unifonn Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA).27

Under these laws,

support enforcement begins with the custodial parent bringing a support enforcement
action in state court.28

The court where the action is brought (the "initiating state")

directs the petition to the jurisdiction where it is believed that the non-custodial parent
is located.29 The court in this jurisdiction (the "responding state") attempts to enforce
the order by obtaining jurisdiction over non-custodial parents and requiring them to
remit their support obligations either to the responding court or to an appropriate state
agency.3O These funds are sent to the initiating court which distributes the money to
the party that brought the action. 3'

24

Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27.

2.5 Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 690.
26 Id.
27 Atkinson, The Child's Need Versus the Parent's Ability to Pay, 12
Aovoc. 26, 28 (Winter 1990).
28 Id.
29

Id.

30

Id.

3l

Id.
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FAM.

Though URESA removed the previous barrier to collecting court-ordered support
from out-of-state non-custodial parents,32 the Act is criticized for the lengthy time
periods required for enforcement by the two jurisdictions, the costs involved for the
responding state, the low priority responding states give URESA cases, and the difficulty
in locating non-custodial parents.33

States' Enforcement Agencies
In 1967, Congress amended the Social Security Act, and, for the first time,
mandated the development and implementation of state-run child support enforcement
programS.34

These amendments, however, did little to help custodial parents receive

more of the support due them, because many states failed to comply with the revised
law. 3s

The federal government was required to provide only fifty percent of the

administrative costs of enacting the states' programs, and it did nothing to enforce the
state programs' implementation. 36

Title N-D: Addressing a Growing Problem
By 1974, seventy-eight percent of the children eligible for AFDC funding,
approximately 6,062,000 children, were so situated because of the absence of a parent. 37
Only about a fourth of these children were provided for by court-ordered or voluntary
arrangements to provide child support 38 Of this group, only about twenty-one percent

32

Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 689-91.

33

Id. at 691.

34 Id. at 692.
3S

Id.

36

Id.

37

Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27.

38

Id.
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actually received the full amount of the money owed them. 39

As a result of this

growing need, Congress, in 1975, added Title IV-D to the Social Security Act to
address child support issues. 4O

The federal and state programs envisioned by the

amendments were to provide four basic areas of service:

locating absent parents

responsible for providing child support, establishing paternity, establishing appropriate
amounts of support, and enforcing support obligations.41 The Congressional intent in
passing the amendments goes well beyond the objective of merely recouping disbursed
AFDC funds from legally responsible parents:
The committee believes that all children have the right to receive support
from their fathers. The committee bill is designed to help children attain
this right, including the right to have their fathers identified so that
support can be obtained. The immediate result will be a lower welfare
cost to the taxpayer but, more importantly, as an effective support
collection system is established fathers will be deterred from deserting
their families to welfare and the children will be spared the effects of
family break-up.42
The government also demonstrated an intent to enforce the new amendment by
providing guidelines that state programs must meet in order to qualify for federal
reimbursement of seventy-five percent of the state's administrative costS. 43 Finally, the
amendments created the federal Parent Locator Service, which provides state agencies
with data from the Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and
Department of Defense, which would otherwise be unavailable to the states' own locator
services.44 The federal Parent Locator Service was designed to complement and enhance

39

Id.

40
42 U.S.c. §§ 651-62 (1988); see Increased Federal Involvement, supra note
22, at 692-93.

41 Haynes, Legislative Update: More N-D Follow-Up, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 11, 11
(Spring 1988).
42
Hearings on Senate Bills 1842 and 2081 before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 93rd Cong., lst Sess. (1973), cited in Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27.

43 42 U.S.c. § 652(a) (1988).
44

Id.
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the resources of each state's parent locator service,45 and to fit in with the federal
government's new role, under Title IV-D, as an overseer of the states' support
enforcement programs.46

IRS Cooperation in Enforcement
In 1981, Congress brought the Internal Revenue Service into child support
enforcement by allowing overdue support payments to be collected through the
interception of non-custodial parents' federal income

tax

refunds. 47 This streamlined the

tax-intercept procedures previously provided for in the 1975 amendments.48
The 1975 law instructed the IRS to provide "full collection" of delinquent
debts.49 Under the 1975 act, the IRS could garnish the wages of AFDC or non-AFDC
delinquent parents, attach and sell their property, or intercept their federal tax refund
and forward it to the state requesting collection of the support obligation. so In order to
receive this service, the debt needed to be delinquent in the amount of at least $750
and established by an administrative or court order. 51 Further, the state child support
enforcement agency had to describe to the IRS the "collection actions" it had taken,

4S

Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 693 n.29.

46 Id. at 694.
47 42 U.S.C. § 644 (1988); see Roberts, In the Frying Pan and In the Fire:
AFDC Custodial Parents and the N-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1407, 1408
(Apr. 1985) [hereinafter Custodial Parents].
48 See Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 697; Note, In Support
of Support: The Federal Tax Refund Offset Program, 37 TAX LAW. 719, 723-24
(1984) [hereinafter In Support].
49

In Support, supra note 48, at 723.

so

Id.

51

Id.
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why they were not effective, and why further state actions would not be successful in
collecting the debt.51
Under the 1981 Amendments, the Internal Revenue Service can become involved
in the collection of AFDC arrearages of just $150, if the debt is at least three months
old, and if the state child support enforcement agency demonstrates to the Department
of Health and Human Services that the state has taken reasonable measures to collect
the overdue support. 53

The only collection method available under this "streamlined

procedure" is to reduce the responsible parent's federal income

tax

refund by the

amount of ordered support. 54

Expanding the System: The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments
In 1984, Congress further amended the Social Security Act to enhance the states'
powers to enforce child support obligations and to make the services of state support
enforcement agencies available to all custodial parents, regardless of their eligibility for
AFDC benefits.55 A major effect of this set of amendments was its impact upon the
substance of state laws; the 1984 amendments required that each state legislatively

51 1d. at 724 n.34.
53

1d. at 724.

54

Id.

The 1974 amendments only provided these services to custodial parents who
were AFDC recipients. Implications, supra note 16, at 302 n.lO.
55

The major objectives of the 1984 amendments are: to
encourage states to aggressively seek child support
collection for children not receiving welfare benefits; to
mandate nationwide enforcement techniques that have
already been proven successful; to provide fmancial
rewards to states that improve enforcement programs; to
audit all state programs; and to strengthen interstate
enforcement techniques.

Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 700.
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provide for certain techniques of support collection. 56

Among these techniques are

mandatory withholding of the income of the non-custodial parent, interception of federal
and state income tax refunds, liens, bonds to guarantee support payments, a mandatory
report of the non-custodial parent's support obligation sent to credit agencies, guidelines
for child support awards, and expedited proceedings to handle child support cases. 57
The 1984 amendments clearly announce the intention of Congress to rule on the
adequacy of state child support laws. 58

Still Stronger Enforcement Powers
In the 1988 Family Support Act,59 Congress made the states' new child support
enforcement powers still stronger by providing stricter wage withholding of child
support payments, rebuttable support guidelines for ascertaining support obligations,
review of child support orders at least every three years, and federal standards for
establishing paternity. 60

The Current Federal N-D System
With the successive changes in the welfare law (particularly with the 1984 Social
Security Act amendments), applicants for AFDC programs must assign their rights to

56
Dodson & Horowitz, What to Do About the Growing Problem of Child
Support, 71 A.B.A. J. 133, 133 (Sept. 1985); Private Responsibility, supra note 18,
at 8.

Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8-9. Federal regulations define
"expedited processes" as "any administrative or expedited judicial processes in which
the presiding officer is not a judge of court, which increase the effectiveness of the
establishment and enforcement process, and which meet specific processing time
frames."; 45 C.F.R. § 303.101 (1990); Henry & Swartz, supra note 20, at 77.
57

58

Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8.

59 Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
60 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 11; Roberts, Tenth Annual Review
of Poverty Law: Child Support Enforcement in 1989, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1101,
1104-05 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Tenth Annual Review].
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receive child support to the IV -D agency and agree to cooperate with the agency in
locating the non-custodial parents, establishing paternity and support orders against
them, and enforcing the orders.61 Through the custodial parents' assignments, the state
acquires a financial interest, equal to the total AFDC payments, against the responsible
parents. The state is in a better position than custodial parents to recover these funds,
as it has the resources of the federal government and the reciprocal cooperation of the
other states behind it. 62

Implementation of a program this wide-spread is inevitably

difficult and has resulted in various criticisms,63 but the federal government's attempt
to unify and coordinate states' child support programs unquestionably provides a greater
opportunity for fair resolutions of children's needs and parents' obligations. 64

THE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT: VIRGINIA'S IV-D PROGRAM
Virginia's response to the Congressional initiatives on child support enforcement
was the creation of the Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE or Division), a
subdivision of the Commonwealth's Department of Social Services. 6S The functions of

61

Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 7.

62

Id. at 7-8.

63 Id. at 12 (still "wide variations" in different states' collection performance
and enforcement of child support laws); Custodial Parents, supra note 47, at 1410
(states benefitting from support collection causes indifference or hostility towards the
IV-D agency); Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1109 (complaints about the
timeliness and adequacy of service by the agency involved); Implications, supra note
16, at 304, 307 (constitutional concerns regarding wage withholding and the tax
refund intercept program).
64
Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 29 (the benefits of a child support
enforcement program are not to be measured solely by the funds collected to
reimburse state and federal AFDC disbursements; the "indirect cost evidence"
achieved by keeping other custodial parents "off AFDC" must also be taken into
account).

Acts 1974, Session 1974, enacted April 5, 1974, amending Virginia Code to
add Sections 63.1-249 through 63.1-290.
6S
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the Division are governed by Title 63, Chapters 13 and 14 of the Virginia Code.66
DCSE operates through sixteen offices located throughout the Commonwealth, and is
staffed with program support personnel and Support Enforcement Specialists. 67
Although the Policy Manual for the Division is careful to point out that DCSE staff
may not take any attorney-like role in the agency's cases,68 agency personnel perform
many of the pre-trial tasks required in enforcement proceedings.69 Legal counsel for the
Division is provided by a Special Counsel in the Attorney General's office, specifically
assigned to child support enforcement matters, or representation may be obtained
through cooperative agreements with Commonwealth Attorneys, city or county attorneys,
or members of the private bar. 70
The services available from the DCSE are those mandated by Title IV-D:

(1)

Locating responsible parents and putative fathers in order to establish their child support
obligation; (2) establishing putative fathers' paternity; (3) establishing and modifying
orders for child support payments; (4) administratively and judicially enforcing spousal
support if such support is ordered as part of the child support order; and (5) collecting
and disbursing child support payments. 71 In addition, the Division provides information
about its functions and parental rights and responsibilities through brochures available
at its offices.

66

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-249 to -274.9 (Supp. 1990).

67
Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child
Support Enforcement Policy Manual, ch. A, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Policy Manualj;
Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Pub. No. 032-01-935,
Facts About Child Support Enforcement For Custodial Parents [hereinafter Support
Enforcement Pamphlet].

68 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. A, 1.
69

[d. at 2.

70

[d. at 3.

11

[d. at ch. C, 1.
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The Parent Locator Service
The parent locator service offered by the Division is the State Parent Locator
Service, which searches the Commonwealth for the absent parent, coordinates with other
states' locator services to find responsible parents who have left Virginia, and uses the
federal Parent Locator Service to search for responsible parents on a national level.72
On the federal level, new regulations that are applicable to the states and designed to
improve the quality of parent locator services became effective October I, 1990.73

Establishing Paternity
The Division of Child Support Enforcement uses both administrative means and
the court system to establish paternity.

Administratively, in a situation where the

putative father is willing to admit paternity of the child for whom support is sought, the
Support Enforcement Specialist informs the putative father that he has been identified
as the child's parent and asks him to verify the claim. 74 If the putative father does so,
he is advised of his "rights and responsibilities regarding the issue of paternity."7s

The

putative father then reads a Declaration of Paternity Form and signs, under oath, a
Paternity Rights and Responsibilities Statement.76

Both the custodial parent and the

putative father sign the Declaration of Paternity form, and each receives a copy.n The

72

Support Enforcement Pamphlet, supra note 67.

73

Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1104-05.

74 Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. D, 1 (1990). The DCSE Policy Manual
uses the term "putative fater" to refer to the party whose paternity the Division is
attempting to establish.
7S

[d. at 2.

76

[d.

n

[d.
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Division files this document with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
(J&DR Court), where the judge signs it as a court order.78
If the putative father denies paternity but agrees to have the probability of his
paternity tested, he is informed of his duties and privileges as a parent, and is asked
to sign a form acknowledging these obligations. 79 In order to be voluntarily tested for
paternity, the putative father must also sign the Voluntary Agreement for Genetic Blood
Testing Form.80 If the genetic test results in a finding of probability of ninety-eight
percent or better that the putative father is the child's father, he is declared the legal
father as of the date that the positive test results are received by the Division, and must
pay DCSE for the expenses of all of the parties' blood tests (the mother's, the child's,
and his own).8! The father receives a copy of the Paternity Certification Form, which
is filed with the court and becomes a binding court order.82

If the genetic testing

results show a probability of less than ninety-eight percent that the putative father is
indeed the father, DCSE may pursue the paternity issue in court. 83 If the court excludes
the possibility of the putative father's paternity, the Division pays the costs of the blood
tests. 84
Finally, paternity may be established only through the J&DR Court system if the
putative father does not voluntarily agree to genetic testing. 8s

The child's mother

completes a Mother's Affidavit of Paternity Form, and, in cases where public assistance

78 Id.
79

Id.

80

Id.

8! Id. at 3.
82

Id. at 2-3.

83 Id. at 3.
84

Id.

8S

Id. at 3.
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is not involved, fills out a Financial Statement. 86 If the mother is receiving Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) benefits,81 she is presumed to have no income and does not
complete a Financial Statement. Both documents are notarized. 88 The agency or the
mother ftles a paternity petition with the J&DR court, which orders blood testing of all
the parties. 89 The results of these tests are filed at DCSE.!IO
Genetic testing is not the only form of evidence used in establishment of a
paternal obligation. The court also considers whether the putative father and the mother
were openly living together at the time that the child was probably conceived, the use
of the putative father's name on the child's birth certificate, the child's use of the
putative father's last name at any time since birth, and any government forms or
'statements signed by the putative father that declare or claim the child as his own. 91
Federally, paternity testing is the area of domestic relations law that has changed
the most significantly in the past decade, both because of a new, longer statute of
limitations for paternity establishment92 and due to the technological development of
more advanced means of testing for paternity.93 New federal regulations demand that
the state must attempt to establish paternity within ninety calendar days of locating a

86

Id.

81 Aid to Dependent Children is a public assistance grant paid by .the
Commonwealth to support dependent children. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-87 (1987).
88

Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. D, 3 (1990).

89

Id.

!IO Id.
91
Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Pub. No. 032-0193211, Facts About Establishing Paternity in Virginia [hereinafter Paternity
Pamphlet].

92

42 U.S.c. § 666(a)(5)(A)(i) (1988).

93

Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1102.
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putative

father.~

A putative father's paternity must be established or excluded within

one year of service of process or the child's becoming six month's old, whichever is
later,9S to judicially establish paternity.

Establishing the Support Obligation

The 1984 Child Support Enforcement amendments to the Social Security Act
mandated that states formulate guidelines to determine appropriate child support
awards. 96 Section 20-108.2 of the Virginia Code complies with the federal law.97 In
Virginia, the methods used to set the amount of child support obligation differ
depending upon whether or not the custodial parent is a recipient of public assistance
(PA).!l8

In a "non-PA" case, where the custodial parent is not receiving public

assistance, the Support Enforcement Specialist interviews both the custodial and noncustodial parents, requires each of them to complete Financial Statements, and instructs
them to report any future changes in their financial situations. 99

Child support is

established by taking into account each parent's income, monetary support paid to other
children for whom the parent is responsible, and each parent's earning potential. 100 If
the responsible parent does not appear at the interview in which the Support

~

45 C.F.R. § 303.5(a)(1) (1990).

9S 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(a)(2) (1990).
96

42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).

97 VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-108.2 (1990). In accordance with the 1988 Child
Support Enforcement Amendments, Virginia's support figures are rebuttably presumed
to be a proper level of support. [d.

!l8 Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. E, 1-11 (1990).
99

100

[d. at ch. D, 3-4.

VA.

CoDE

ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -108.1, -108.2 (1990).
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Enforcement Specialist gathers this information, the agency may establish a default
judgment against him.lol
If the custodial parent receives benefits from the ADC program, he or she is

considered to have no income, and is neither interviewed nor required to fill out a
financial statement. 102

In any case involving a custodial parent receiving public

assistance, it is likewise unnecessary to attempt to interview the non-custodial parent
before establishing a default obligation. I03 The amount of the default debt is set at the
level of ADC benefits paid to the custodial parent. 104
Once the appropriate level of support is determined, DCSE must establish the
debt. lOS

In a case where ADC payments have been paid to the custodial parent, the

debt is established by sending an Administrative Support Order to the responsible
parent, directing him to pay the stated amount. I06 The Administrative Support Order
serves three purposes: it notifies the responsible parent that public assistance has been

Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 5. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
101

102

Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 5.

103

Id.

104 Id.
If a default obligation is established for a non-custodial parent in a
non-PA case, the default obligation is set at the amount of ADC benefits that would
be paid to the custodial parent, based upon the number of children supported and the
area where the custodial parent and children reside. Policy Manual, supra note 67,
ch. E, apps. B and C (1990).

lOS Id. at 5.
106
Id. at ch. E, 13. An Administrative Support Order is defined by the
Division of Child Support Enforcement Policy Manual as

a non-court ordered legally enforceable support obligation based on the
income of the Responsible Parent and Custodial Parent as applied to
the Support Scale, or a non-court ordered, legally enforceable
obligation based on the amount of the public assistance grant paid or
that could be paid for non-PA cases. The administrative order has the
same force and effect as a court order.
Id. at Glossary of Terms, 2.
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or is being provided to persons to whom the responsible parent owes a legal duty of
support, and that a child support debt is accordingly owed to the Commonwealth; it
informs a responsible parent that, although the custodial parent may not be a recipient
of public assistance, he or she has requested that child support enforcement assist
him/her in collection of child support; and, finally, it advises the responsible parent that
an Immediate Withholding of Earnings is about to be implemented against him or her.l07
The Support Enforcement Specialist must schedule an appointment with the
responsible parent within thirty days of service of the Administrative Support Order, to
permit the responsible parent to provide financial information to the agency. From this
information, the agency may set the parent's support obligation in accordance with his
or her ability to pay.l08 If the responsible parent does not appear for this meeting, or
fails to provide a financial statement, his or her obligation remains at the amount set
forth on the Administrative Support Order.I09
To establish the debt in a non-PA case where the responsible parent has had a
default obligation entered against him or her, the agency serves an Administrative
Support Order with the default amount included in it. l1O Once the ten-day period for
appeal of the Administrative Support Order has passed, the agency files a non-support
petition in the J&DR Court for enforcement. 11 I

Collecting the Debt
Child support in Virginia is paid in one of three ways. First, a court may order
the non-custodial parent to pay support directly to the custodial parent; DCSE is not

107 [d. at ch. E, 12-13.
108 [d. at 7.
109 [d.
110

[d.

III [d.
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involved.1l2

Alternatively, if custodial parents do not receive public assistance, they

may opt to receive their child support payments through DCSE. 113 Custodial parents
receiving public assistance are legally required to use the Division's services. ll4 In any
case where the Division provides collection service, the custodial parent must fIrst
assign to DCSE any rights to receive funds from the responsible parent. Finally, if a
non-custodial parent agrees to pay child support through voluntary assignment of his or
her earnings, he or she signs an Assignment of Earnings form under oath, the form is
sent to his or her employer, and the employer automatically forwards a portion of each
of the responsible parent's paychecks to DCSE. llS These funds are credited against the
non-custodial parent's support obligation. 116

If the non-custodial parent refuses to

voluntarily assign his or her wages to the agency, the Support Enforcement Specialist
notifies the parents that, as soon as the obligation is legally established, an Immediate
Withholding of Earnings Form will be issued to his or her employer. 117 The Immediate
Withholding of Earnings Form operates in the same manner as a voluntary assignment:
it is served upon the responsible parent's employer, who forwards a percentage of the
responsible parent's pay each pay period to the Division. 118

Harman, A System Overload, 39 VA. LAW. 12, 15 (Sept. 1990) (referring to
112
"direct pay" as an alternative to DCSE involvement in the enforcement of child
support payments).
113
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-250.2 (Supp. 1988); Support Enforcement Pamphlet,
supra note 67.

114

Support Enforcement Pamphlet, supra note 67.

lIS

Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. E, 10 (1990).

116
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(A) (Supp. 1990). The employer's duty to
comply with the withholding of earnings is set forth at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79.3
(1990).

117

VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 63.1-250.3, -258.1 (Supp. 1990).

118

Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 10.
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Wage assignments may only be released by the Division of Child Support
Enforcement.

These assignments will only be discontinued upon satisfaction of the

responsible parent's current obligation and aU arrearages owing for past support, or
upon replacement by a Mandatory Withholding of Earnings or an Immediate
Withholding of Earnings. 119

Enforcement
Enforcement of child support orders is the aspect of federally mandated state
programs that has brought about the greatest degree of change in states' child support
systems. 120

Pursuant to the Title IV-D, Virginia's Division of Child Support

Enforcement employs a number of child support enforcement techniques, including
immediate and mandatory withholding of earnings, liens and foreclosures, reports to
credit agencies, orders to "withhold and deliver" assets of the obligor, unemployment
compensation benefits, and state and federal tax refund interception programs. 121

1.

Immediatc? Withholding of Earnings.
Once a support debt is established, each Administrative Support Order issued

after July 1, 1988 is required to contain an Immediate Withholding of Earnings.l22 The
administrative order is issued to the responsible parent's employer, directing its payroll
department to deduct a specified amount from each of the responsible parent's

119

[d. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.

120 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8.
121 See Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. F, 1-48 (1990). While the following
does not constitute an in-depth exploration of the various means available for the
Commonwealth to enforce child support orders, it is intended to provide an overview
of the more frequently-utilized methods.
122 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(A) (Supp. 1990).
193

paychecks. 123

The responsible parent may appeal the Immediate Withholding of

Earnings, but must limit any objections to the issue of whether he/she actually owes a
support obligation or to the accuracy of the information appearing on the Administrative
Support Order.l24 In the event of an appeal, the agency may not implement any wage
withholding until the Hearings Officer hearing the appeal makes a determination as to
the validity of the Administrative Support Order.l25

2.

Mandatory Withholding Of Earnings.
A Mandatory Withholding of Earnings (MWE) operates in a similar manner to

the Immediate Withholding of Earnings. The Immediate Withholding of Earnings, an
administrative enforcement technique, however, may not be used unless the responsible
parent works in Virginia, holds attachable assets in the Commonwealth, or is otherwise
subjected to Virginia law. l26 The MWE, though also an administrative remedy, may be
used for both in-state and out-of-state cases. 127

Like an Immediate Withholding of

Earnings, the Mandatory Withholding of Earnings is served upon the responsible
parent's employer, and the order takes precedence over any other state law claims upon
the employee's income, except for prior wage reduction orders to pay child support. l28
A responsible parent's administrative appeal rights are, as with the Immediate
Withholding of Earnings, limited in scope, and may address only a mistake of fact as
to the identity of the responsible parent or error in the calculation of current child

123 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(C), (D) (1990).
124 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. F, 2a.
125

[d.

126 [d. at 2b.
127 [d.
128 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79 .3(A)(7) (1990).
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support or arrearages owed. 129

Unlike the Immediate Withholding of Earnings, the

MWE remains in effect while the responsible parent's appeal is pending.

If the

responsible parent is found not to be liable for all or part of the support debt being
withheld from his/her wages, the agency will return any money collected during the
appeal process. 130

3.

Liens and Orders to Withhold and Deliver.
For the Division to establish a lien against a responsible parent's real or personal

property, that parent must either reside, be employed, or hold attachable property in the
Commonwealth. \31 If the parent is a federal employee, a lien may be established if the
responsible parent either resides or works outside of Virginia. 132

If the responsible

parent is employed outside the Commonwealth by an employer who has a registered
agent in Virginia, the responsible parent's income is subject to attachment. \33
Orders to Withhold and Deliver also operate to attach the responsible parent's
property, but where a lien serves as an encumbrance of the responsible parent's real or
personal property,t34 an Order to Withhold and Deliver is generally used to collect
delinquent, not current support obligations, by collecting the responsible parent's
financial holdings, such as stocks, bonds, bank accounts, and trust account income. 135
Orders to Withhold may be sent to all of the holders of the responsible parent's assets

129

Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. F, 6a (1990).

130 Id.
131 Id. at 9.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See id.
135 Id. at 10.
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until the amount of debt owed by the responsible parent is collected. l36

When the

agency serves the holders of the responsible parent's assets with the order to withhold,
it must similarly serve the responsible parent and afford him or her the right to an
administrative appeal. 137 If the Division wins the appeal, it sends an Order to Deliver
to the holders of the responsible parent's assetS. I38

4.

Tax refund collection.
Interception of responsible parents' state and federal tax refunds operates as a

form of withholding of the refunds for the satisfaction of arrearage debts. l39 Before any
funds may be collected in this manner, the Internal Revenue Service Enforcement
provides the responsible parent with advance notice that the support obligation had been
forwarded to the agency for collection, and informs the parent of his/her right to
administrative review of this decision. l40 The responsible parent is entitled to not only
the administrative review, but also an administrative appeal and judicial review of the
certification of his debt for collection. 141 The responsible parent's tax refund is returned
to him/her if DCSE had mistakenly certified the arrearage debt to the IRS, the
responsible parent has fully paid his or her debt, or the total amount collected from his
state and federal tax refunds exceeds the amount certified for collection. 142
As a last resort, any N-D agency may request, through the federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement, full collection services by the Internal Revenue Service of

136

Id.

137

Id. at 10-11.

138

Id. at 10.

139

Implications, supra note 16, at 310.

140

Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. F, 22 (1990).

141

Id. at 23.

142

Id.
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any delinquent sUpport. 143 To qualify for this collection assistance, the agency must
"have made reasonable efforts to collect child support without success,"I44 the obligation
must be legally enforceable (either in the form of a court order or an Administrative
Support Order), and the amount certified for collection must exceed $750. 145

Interaction with the Division of Child Support Enforcement
One of the objectives of the Division of Child Support Enforcement is to
"maximize the use of non-attorneys to the extent permitted by law"l46 in providing its
services to citizens of the Commonwealth. However, there is still a need for attorney
interaction with the Division.

Responsible parents may be injured by the expedited

procedures practiced by the Division, and their due process rights may be threatened by
the child support enforcement's collections procedures. 147 IV-D agencies may harm the
custodial parents they were designed to assist,t48 particularly in jurisdictions where, as
in Virginia, the IV-D agency is still working to establish itself.

Attorneys involved

with the system in those jurisdictions can help the establishment process by increasing

143
Id. at 26. For a discussion of the IRS "full collection services," see supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 27.

146

Id. at ch. A, 3.

147
See Cipriani, Child Support Enforcement Curriculum: Defenses, 36 Juv. &
FAM. Cr. J. 115 (Fall 1985) (defenses to child support orders and actions); Barber,
Update on Title N-D, 1 AM. J. FAM. L. 383, 389 (1987) (questionable constitutional
Validity of wage withholding regulations that do not provide opportunities for
responsible parents to challenge "the jurisdictional validity of, the underlying order").
148
See Harman, supra note 112, at 12, 12-13 (despite "good intentions,"
Virginia's conversion from the court collection system to a IV-D system resulted in
chaotic attempts to coordinate support funds for both AFDC and non-PA custodial
parents).
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their awareness of the agency's status and growth and advising clients of alternative
means of support enforcement. 149

CONCLUSION

Despite some of the difficulties of implementing a comprehensive program to
effectively collect and enforce child support without infringing upon the constitutional
rights of the non-custodial parent, efforts to ensure such a system are essential for the
nurturing and protection of America's children.

A unified national child support

enforcement program affords children in all of the states an opportunity for fair and
consistent child support, helps keep custodial parents from finding it necessary to tum
to public assistance for support, and establishes a proportionate share of child rearing
responsibility upon each parent.
Virginia's Division of Child Support Enforcement reflects the Commonwealth's
concern for and committment to this unified national system. By consolidating child
support issues into a single agency, the Commonwealth relieves Virginia's court system
of many enforcement and paternity issues, and ensures that the children of Virginia are
at least as well cared for as children throughout the United States.

149

[d. at 15.
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